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Land Use By, For, and Of the People:
Problems With the Application of
Initiatives and Referenda to the
Zoning Process
I. INTRODUCTION
Land uses inherently conflict with each other, particularly within
the confines of large municipalities,' which must fit residential, com-
mercial, and industrial land uses within limited areas. The basic the-
ory of zoning is that municipalities should adopt comprehensive
zoning ordinances in order to minimize conflicts between incompati-
ble uses of land.2 Because zoning ordinances map out land uses on
community-wide scales, they affect the entire population of a commu-
nity.3 Consequently, a major issue in zoning focuses on who makes
the zoning decisions. Municipalities by themselves lack the authority
1. W.G. ROESELER, GENERAL POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES FOR PROTOTYPE ZONING
ORDINANCES AND RELATED MEAsuREs 1 (1976).
2. This Comment utilizes the terms "comprehensive plan" and "zoning ordi-
nance." A comprehensive plan, also known as a "general plan" or a "master plan,"
sets out land use policies and goals, as well as the general land use districts or zones
for a community. ROBERT C. ELLCScON & A. DAN TARL.)CK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 36
(1981) [hereinafter LAND-USE]. A zoning ordinance implements the comprehensive
plan and restricts land uses, lot sizes, building placements, structure heights and areas
for particular zones. Id. Because state zoning enabling acts mandate that zoning ordi-
nances be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, the term "comprehensive
zoning ordinance" will hereinafter be used to denote a zoning ordinance that has been
effectuated in accordance with a comprehensive plan. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65000-66499.58 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
3. Only a "rezoning" can change a zoning ordinance. A rezoning requires passage
of a new ordinance to replace the previous ordinance. Passage of a new ordinance re-
quires planning commission hearings and debate. Rezonings, therefore, are not easy to
obtain, and may consume much, time. Because the rezoning process may be long and
difficult, the enactment of original zoning ordinances is especially important to com-
munity residents, who want to, ensure that the original ordinance is in accord with
community landowners' goals. One court noted that "[u]ndeniably, zoning issues often
are of great public interest and some... may concern the entire population of the mu-
nicipality concerned." Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 312 A.2d 154, 156 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 317 A.2d 706 (N.J. 1974). See generally ROBERT M.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (2d ed. 1976); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65000-66499.58
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
to zone.4 In order to enact zoning ordinances, cities must rely on
grants of police power authority from the state sovereign in the form
of zoning enabling legislation.5 Once a municipality acquires power
to zone, the city council enacts ordinances, relying on planning com-
mission hearings and analyses in its decisions.6
A controversial question presents itself at this juncture: How
much authority should community residents have in the zoning pro-
cess? There is much debate on this issue.7 One argument asserts
that because land use planning, comprehensive plans and zoning ordi-
nances are very complex matters, zoning decisions should by made
exclusively by elected representatives in the city council.8 These rep-
resentatives have the long-term interests of the community in mind,
unlike the electorate who might act out of personal interest, without
the full information or technical knowledge required to make valid
long-term land use decisions. 9 Diametrically opposed to such a posi-
tion are those who favor zoning initiatives and referenda or "zoning
by direct electoral legislation."' 0 Advocates of direct legislation zon-
ing argue that residents should be intricately involved in the zoning
process because of the community-wide impact of zoning decisions.1
Many states believe that community residents should have more
than simple representative authority in the zoning process. These
states have allowed city residents to participate directly in the zoning
process via initiative and referendum.12 In initiatives, municipal vot-
4. LAND-USE, aUpra note 2, at 39-42.
5. Id. at 40-41.
6. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act provides as follows:
In order to avail itself of the powers conferred by this act, such legislative
body shall appoint a commission, to be known as the zoning commission, to
recommend the boundaries of the various original districts and appropriate
regulations to be enforced therein. Such commission shall make a prelimi-
nary report and hold public hearings thereon before submitting its final re-
port, and such legislative body shall not hold its public hearings or take action
until it has received the final report of such commission. Where a city plan
commission already exists, it may be appointed as the zoning commission.
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT OF 1926, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, re-
printed in 8 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 53.01[1] (1983).
See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
7. See Paul Marcotte, Zoning By Vote, A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 20.
8. Robert H. Freilich & Derek B. Guemmer, Removing Artificial Barriers to
Public Participation in Land-Use Policy: Fffective Zoning and Planning by Initiative
and Referenda, 21 URB. LAw. 511, 516-20 (1989) [hereinafter Freilich].
9. Id.
10. Id. at 516-18. This Comment utilizes the terms "initiatives and referenda," "di-
rect electoral legislation," and "plebiscite" interchangeably. All three terms refer to
the mechanisms by which the people may enact laws separately from the legislature.
For the reasons why initiatives and referenda originated and were later applied to the
zoning process, see infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 13-14 (initiative and referendum defined).
11. See Freiich, supra note 8, at 511-13.
12. See infra notes 194-95, 312 and accompanying text.
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ers bypass the city council and directly enact zoning ordinances.1S In
referenda, zoning decisions made by the city council are referred to
municipal voters who may either approve or reject the ordinances.14
The application of direct electoral legislation to the zoning process
generates a significant legal issue: can the direct legislative process
fulfill sufficient procedural and substantive requirements so that it
may be validly applied to zoning decisions? In theory, direct legisla-
tion would eliminate a variety of zoning problems, such as electoral
relief from poor city council zoning decisions and land use policies in
discord with the popular will. In practice, however, the application of
initiatives and referenda to the zoning process creates many more
legal problems and inconsistencies than it resolves.
Three consecutive problems crystallize around the application of
initiatives and referenda to zoning. These problems arise! from the
three requirements that a zoning plebiscite must fulfill in order to be
valid: (1) the legislative act requirement,' 5 (2) state zoning enabling
act procedural requirements,' 6 and (3) the comprehensive plan re-
quirement. 17 In addition to these requirements are concerns gener-
ated by the permissive level of judicial review accorded to direct
legislative zoning decisions.I8
First, although legislatures on the national and state level gener-
ally exercise only legislative functions, local legislatures often exer-
cise additional functions that are administrative in nature.' 9
Initiatives and referenda may be applied only to acts that are legisla-
tive in nature.20 Thus, only zoning decisions characterized as legisla-
tive may be properly subjected to direct legislation. Consequently,
administrative zoning decisions are immune from the initiative and
referendum process. The state courts determine whether a zoning
13. 7 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 50.03[7] (1983).
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 140-280 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 281-322 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 323-404 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 402-415 and accompanying text.
19. See Fasano v. Board of County Commrs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973), superceded
by statute as slated in Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, (Or. 1979), disap-
proved in part in Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980).
20. 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 29C.03 (4th ed.
1990); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976); In re
Pfahler, 88 P. 270 (Cal. 1906); Anderson v. Smith, 377 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. App. 1964); Bra-
zell v. Zeigler, 110 P. 1052 (Okla. 1910); Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982);
Kadderly v. Portland, 74 P. 710 (Or. 1903).
decision is legislative or administrative.2 1 Although states uniformly
agree that the adoption of a comprehen.sive plan is legislative in na-
ture,22 they are split as to which types of zoning ordinances, if any,
constitute legislative acts.23 Certain states have held that zoning and
rezoning ordinances are legislative and, therefore, proper subjects for
direct legislation.24 Other states have ruled that while comprehen-
sive zoning ordinances are legislative in nature, rezonings are admin-
istrative acts and, thus, cannot be applied to a plebiscite.2 5 Because
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that state characteriza-
tions of legislative acts are binding in the zoning context, the original
split among states has deepened.26 The schism is rendered especially
confusing by the diversity of tests used to determine whether an act
is legislative or administrative.
Second, if a zoning act successfully fulfills the legislative act re-
quirement, it must then meet state zoning enabling act procedural re-
quirements.27 Municipalities derive their zoning power from state
zoning enabling acts.28 The grant of power from state to municipality
generally imposes certain procedural requirements and limitations
which, in certain states, have been found prohibitive to direct legisla-
tive zoning.29 Other states have ruled that procedural requirements
and limitations in state enabling acts apply exclusively to city coun-
cils and not to the direct legislative process.30 These states may be
brushing with procedural due process violations because their deci-
sions have failed to take into account the minimum procedural due
process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard. City
councils are statutorily required to grant notice and a hearing to
landowners whose land will be zoned.31 Initiatives and referenda,
however, may not accord landowners with sufficient due process pro-
21. See inIfra notes 193-280 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 194-95, 312 and accompanying text.
23. See id&
24. Freilich, supra note 8, at 529. See infra notes 194-95, 312 and accompanying
text.
25. Freilich, supra note 8, at 529. See infra notes 194-95, 312 and accompanying
text.
26. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.9 (1976).
See Freilich, supra note 8, at 528-29.
27. See infra notes 281-322 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65800-65863.12 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1991)
and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1 (West 1989) (zoning enabling legislation). For a de-
tailed analysis of how state zoning enabling legislation has followed the provisions of
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, see NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., 1 AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAw 361-70 (1974). Professor Williams concludes that 47 states have
followed the provisions of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. See also, ROBERT
R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE 657-58 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing state zon-
ing enabling legislation) [hereinafter WRIGHT & GITELMAN].
29. See infra notes 194-95, 312 and accompanying text.
30. See id.
31. Notice and a hearing are required by state zoning enabling statutes. See, e.g.,
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cedures. The permission to continue direct legislative zoning when
plebiscites do not fulfill due process considerations is disturbing at
best.
Third, if the legislative act and state enabling act requirements
have been met, direct legislative zoning encounters another obsta-
cle-the comprehensive plan.32 State zoning enabling acts require
that zoning ordinances be passed "in accordance with a comprehen-
sive plan."3 3 The comprehensive plan outlines the general land use
policies and zones of a community.34 It is a well settled point of law
that zoning ordinances are only valid if they have been passed pursu-
ant to considerations of the comprehensive plan.35 Failure to con-
sider the comprehensive plan when enacting site-specific zoning or
rezoning is considered illegal "spot-zoning,"3 6 a taboo of the zoning
process. Because city councils consider planning commission hear-
ings and analyses of proposed zonings, it is easy for city council zon-
ing decisions to meet the comprehensive plan requirement.
Initiatives and referenda, however, are decisions made by the electo-
rate. It is doubtful that the general electorate of a community pos-
sesses sufficient information and understanding of the
comprehensive plan with which to enact zoning ordinances that con-
form to the plan.3 7 If zoning decisions made by the electorate do not
conform to the plan, such decisions would in effect constitute illegal
"spot-zoning." The problem is especially difficult to resolve because
of the differing levels of importance attached to comprehensive plans
by states.38 While certain states have ruled that comprehensive plans
are binding documents, other jurisdictions have held that plans are
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65853-65857 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (notice and hearing
mandatory in city council zoning ordinance enactments).
32. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT OF 1926, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, reprinted in 8 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 53.01[1]
(1983). See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.015(4), 197.175(2) (1988).
33. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT OF 1926, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, reprinted in 8 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 53.0111]
(1983).
34. Id.
35. Baker v. Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772, 779 (Or. 1975).
36. "Spot-zoning" is the term used to define the enactment of a site-specific zoning
ordinance without consideration of the comprehensive plan. Spot-zoning is illegal be-
cause it allows the possibility of corruption in city council zoning votes. See LAND-USE,
supra note 2, at 241-47. See 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§§ 5.12-5.22 (3d ed. 1986).
37. See infra notes 405-45 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 323-404 and accompanying text.
merely advisory in nature.39 Depending on which approach a state
adopts, initiatives and referenda may or may not be able to fulfill the
comprehensive plan requirement. Even if one may assume that the
electorate is able to enact zoning ordinances pursuant to a compre-
hensive plan, it is doubtful that the electorate will enact zoning deci-
sions based on the comprehensive plan itself, rather than on personal
prejudices against certain land uses. For example, although an alco-
holism and drug rehabilitation center may be within the policies and
allowable land uses in a community's plan, the electorate might vote
against a decision to zone for such a use on the basis of property
value stability and a desire to keep "bad elements" out of the
community. 40
Fourth in the list of issues generated by the marriage of direct leg-
islation to zoning is the consideration of judicial review. The level of
judicial review accorded to city council zoning decisions is highly def-
erential to the city council. Only those decisions which are "arbitrary
or capricious" may be invalidated.41 Because plebiscites may be ap-
plied only to legislative acts, judicial review of zoning decisions made
by direct legislation is as permissive as review of city council deci-
sions. A permissive level of review for direct legislative zoning deci-
sions allows the electorate to act more out of personal motivations
than out of comprehensive plan and long-term community considera-
tions. Violations of the comprehensive plan requirement are thus
more likely to occur in zoning plebiscites than in city council zoning
actions. However, if the level of judicial review for plebiscite zoning
decisions is as permissive as the level of review for city council deci-
sions, many zoning decisions unrelated to the comprehensive plan
might pass unhindered. Moreover, even if defects of plebiscite zoning
were detected, it is difficult to imagine how a court could find that a
decision by the people themselves is "arbitrary or capricious."
39. LANi'-USE, supra note 2, at 36. See Freilich, supra note 8, at 546-47.
40. See Donnie Radcliffe, Nancy Reagan, Taking Her "Turn" Live; On Larry
King's Show, The First Lady Makes Her TV Talk Debut, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at
F6. Former First Lady Nancy Reagan is a strong advocate against the use of drugs and
founded the "Just Say No To Drugs" project. Id, Nancy Reagan wanted to build a 210-
bed drug rehabilitation center in Lake View Terrace, near Los Angeles, California.
See Lisa Anderson, Her Turn, Her Way, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1989, at 1C. Neighbors of
the proposed development, however, were very much against the development. The
neighbors vehemently protested construction of the drug rehabilitation center. Id. Af-
ter the protestors threatened to picket in front of the Reagans' home in Bel Air, Cali-
fornia, Nancy Reagan abandoned the project. Consequently, the project was
abandoned entirely. Id. This development of affairs in Lake View Terrace, California
is not directly related to zoning per se, but serves as a good example of the strong in-
terest that neighboring landowners have in maintaining the stability of property val-
ues, which are sometimes threatened by land use changes. Indeed, although the drug
rehabilitation center might have depressed surrounding property values, it would also
have benefitted the community in its fight against drugs.
41. See iqfra notes 405-15 and accompanying text.
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The final controversy generated by initiative and referendum zon-
ing is systemic rather than legal. The United States is a representa-
tive democracy. The American government's system of decision
making is a balanced structure wherein the raw will of the people is
refined through the debate of elected representatives into a frame-
work of policies and decisions in accord with the public good.42
There exists much doubt, however, as to whether direct democratic
initiatives and referenda are capable of improving the decision mak-
ing system in the zoning context. It is generally admitted that direct
legislation is a positive tool with which to gauge land use policy on a
wide scale. It is easy to see how the direct legislative approach aids
new cities to determine whether they should adopt pro-growth, slow-
growth, or no-growth policies, and whether to concentrate on resi-
dential, commercial, or industrial land uses. However, it is more dif-
ficult to visualize how the zoning process is rendered more just and
efficient by the direct democratic process of initiative and referen-
dum. To be sure, there are potent arguments on each side of the de-
bate. The direct democratic approach, concerned with corruption and
low confidence in city council officials,43 seeks to cure the ills of de-
mocracy via an increased infusion of democratic power into the mu-
nicipal zoning process.44 The representative approach focuses on the
crucial need, in zoning, of representatives trained in the ever-growing
complexity of zoning and urban planning, and representatives who,
via debate, experience, and knowledge, consider the needs of a com-
munity as a whole, via a comprehensive zoning plan.45
The purpose of this Comment is to elucidate the problems posed to
the applicability of zoning to plebiscites by the legislative act require-
ment, state enabling act procedural requirements, and the compre-
hensive plan requirement. Part II of this Comment reviews the
history of zoning, both from a policy and legal perspective. Part III
focuses on the legislative act requirement, state zoning enabling stat-
ute procedural requirements, and the comprehensive plan require-
ment. Part III also discusses jurisdictional splits, recent trends, and
the problem of permissive judicial review of initiative and referen-
dum zoning ordinances. Finally, Part IV of this Comment analyzes
42. See infra notes 416-45 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 416-45 and accompanying text (discussing theories of represen-
tative government).
arguments both in favor and against the utilization of direct demo-
cratic zoning plebiscites in a representative democracy.
II. THE ZONING PROCESS
Before delving into an examination of the difficulties posed by the
fusion of zoning and the initiative and referendum process, it is es-
sential to understand the basic policies behind the zoning movement,
as well as a few basic precepts of zoning law.
A. History of Zoning
Zoning is the process whereby municipalities minimize the incom-
patibilities between different land uses.46 A comprehensive plan sets
out general land use policies and zones.4 7 Zoning ordinances imple-
ment the plan and restrict land uses, structure heights and areas.4s
The concept of zoning, however, did not exist until the early 1900s. 4 9
Zoning grew out of a combination of two planning movements: the
"garden city" movement and the "city beautiful" movement.50
The garden city movement operated on the principle that urban
concentrations were ugly and repulsive.5 ' The movement's planning
solution to this problem was to isolate residential uses from all other
land uses by substantial open spaces.52
The city beautiful movement presented a more pragmatic approach
by proposing that cities should be beautified as much as possible.53
The city beautiful movement was based on the belief that residential
land use is the best and "highest"54 possible use of land, and that cit-
46. ROESELER, supra note 1, at 1; Interview with Charles I. Nelson, Esq., Professor
of Land Use Planning at Pepperdine University School of Law in Malibu, Cal. (Mar.
21, 1991) [hereinafter Nelson interview]. The theory of land use incompatibilities arose
from the city beautiful movement. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
47. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 36.
48. I&
49. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMiEs E. KiER, PROPERTY 1115 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter PROPERTY]. For an overview of the evolution of original zoning law, see generally
EDWARD BASSET, ZONING: LAws, ADMINISTRATION AND COURT DECISIONS DURING THE
FIRST TWENTY YEARS (1936).
50. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 41-42.
51. Id.
52. The failure of the garden city movement is attributed to the practical fact that
people wanted to live in cities, not in open spaces. Cities, with their commercial and
industrial land uses, provided employment opportunity and services. People preferred
to live in cities where work was available, rather than in "garden" settings away from
commercial and industrial opportunity. Nelson interview, supra note 46.
53. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 42.
54. The term "highest" in this context is the basis for a confusing nomenclature.
The hierarchy of land uses is based on the city beautiful movement, which posited that
"low" intensity use is more favorable than "high" intensity use. Consequently, the
land use hierarchy begins with single-family residential use at the "top" of the scale as
the best possible use of land. In order from "best" possible use to "worst" possible use,
land uses are ordered as follows: single-family medium and high density residential,
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ies should therefore be planned so as to allow as much insulation
from industrial uses as possible.55 The city beautiful movement advo-
cated the geographical arrangement of uses in order of quality of use,
with single family residential use protected from heavy industrial use
by graduated zones of middle and high density residential use, com-
mercial use, and light industrial use, respectively.56 The city beauti-
ful precepts, which granted almost sacred reverence and protection
to residential land use, are still in effect today and serve as the guid-
ing policy of the modern zoning process.57
Until zoning became an essential tool in municipal planning, land
uses were regulated by restrictive covenants and the common law
doctrine of nuisance.5 8 However, as cities rapidly expanded,5 9 restric-
tive covenants and the common law doctrine of nuisance could not ef-
ficiently regulate municipal land uses.6o First, cities enacted
ordinances restricting the heights and areas of buildings.61 Shortly
thereafter, the first zoning ordinances were passed. In 1909, Los An-
geles enacted a zoning ordinance that delineated seven land use
light and heavy commercial, and light and heavy industrial uses. Based on this hierar-
chy, scholars use the terms "upzoning" and "downzoning" to define changes in the use
of land. However, scholars differ on the definitions they give these terms. Certain
scholars use the term "downzoning" to refer to a change in land use from a better to a
worse type of use. Other scholars use the term to define a change in land use from
high to low intensity. Nelson interview, supra note 46. In the opinion of this author,
the term "downzoning" should be used when describing a change in use from higher
intensity to lower intensity because it reflects a change in use intensity, rather than a
change in the optimal use hierarchy.
55. After the watershed case of City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), this theory of zoning became known as "Euclidean zoning," after the name of
the case. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 50.
56. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 50.
57. Although the general precepts of the city beautiful movement still form an in-
tegral part of modern zoning theory, aesthetic policies of zoning were steadily replaced
by more practical considerations of traffic circulation and street sizes in the 1950s.
LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 42.
58. Common law nuisance law provided relief from offensive activities. See gener-
ally Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the
Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 775 (1986). Restrictive covenants allowed
neighboring landowners to contract between themselves in order to enjoin one another
from undertaking certain activities or constructions. See generally Mark Urban, Com-
ment, An Evaluation of the Applicability of Zoning Principles to the Law of Private
Land Use Restrictions, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1655 (1974).
59. Developments in The Law - Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1427, 1433-34 (1978).
60. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsToRY OF AMERICAN LAW 678 (2d ed. 1985).
61. See Act of May 23, 1898, ch. 452, 1898 Mass. Acts 401 (repealed 1941). The city
of Washington, D.C., limited the height of city structures to that of the Capitol Dome
in 1899. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 39.
zones.6 2 The City of New York, however, is credited with the enact-
ment of the first true zoning ordinance 63 in 1916, after the state
amended the city charter and allowed it to zone.64 The New York or-
dinance was not adopted in response to popular outcry, but rather by
small special interests that wanted to stem the popular growth of loft
factories on expensive Fifth Avenue, as well as protect the city from
the blockage of light by New York's growing skyline. After the
New York ordinance was enacted, the practice of zoning spread
through the rest of the country with great speed.66
Because cities are creations of the states, their powers were tradi-
tionally limited to those legislatively granted by the state sovereign.6 7
An important constitutional zoning problem centered on whether cit-
ies could zone absent an express grant of authority by state enabling
legislation.68 In 1926, constitutional attacks based upon the lack of
municipal zoning power prompted then-Secretary of Commerce Her-
bert Hoover to draft 69 the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 70
(hereinafter SZEA). The SZEA provided a guideline for states seek-
ing to empower their municipalities with zoning authority.71 The
SZEA contained three important provisions: (1) a grant of zoning
62. See Ex parte Quong Wo, 118 P. 714 (Cal. 1911). The Los Angeles ordinance
provided for one residential zone and six industrial zones. I&
63. PROPERTY, supra note 49, at 1116.
64. S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 74, 113-14, 162-63 (1969). See generally STANISLAW
J. MAKIELSKI, THE POLITICS OF ZONING (1966).
65. S. Toll stated that "a tiny interest group in the city [was the motivator] ... to
which a much larger community acquiesced when the law was eventually passed in
1916." TOLL, supra note 64, at 164. It is interesting to note that property value was the
motivating force behind even the first true zoning ordinance. See infra notes 411-34
and accompanying text (discussion of how the desire to maintain property value is
translated into legislation).
66. PROPERTY, supra note 49, at 1116.
67. WRIGHT & GITELMAN, supra note 28, at 657.
68. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 36. Some legal scholars continue to oppose the
practice of zoning and criticize it on constitutional grounds. See Berhard H. Siegan,
Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1970). Houston, Texas had always op-
posed the enactment of a zoning ordinance. The city council finally decided to run
counter to decades of nonzoning and enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance in
1991. See HOUSTON, TEX., RESOLUTION 91-36 (1991) (accepting report of neighborhood
initiative committee of planning and zoning commission); HOUSTON, TEX., ORDINANCE
91-63 (1991) (Planning and Zoning Commission Ordinance).
69. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover appointed an advisory committee on
zoning in 1921, which subsequently drafted the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of
1926. BASSET, supra note 49, at 28-29.
70. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT OF 1926, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, reprinted in 8 PATRICK J. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 53.01[1]
(1983) [hereinafter SZEA].
71. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 40. The SZEA provided a set of model rules for
states that wished to grant zoning power to their municipalities. Certain states have
used the SZEA as a model, but have narrowly tailored their enabling acts to their spe-
cific ends. For a list of how state enabling acts have varied from the original SZEA
provisions, see NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., 1 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 361-70
(1974).
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power from the state to its municipalities, (2) a state empowerment
of cities for the division of land into uniform districts (zones),72 and
(3) an underlying provision that cities would regulate land uses in ac-
cordance with a "comprehensive plan."73 The states widely accepted
the SZEA. By 1931, thirty-five states had granted zoning authority to
their respective municipalities. 74 By 1974, the number of states grew
to forty-three.75 All fifty states have adopted the SZEA at some
point in time, although many have modified their grants of zoning
power.76 State zoning enabling acts generally require that city coun-
cils grant notice and an opportunity to be heard to landowners whose
land will be zoned.77 The difficulty that zoning initiatives and refer-
enda have in fulfilling enabling act due process requirements is one
of the central problems of the direct legislative zoning process.78
Although the SZEA provided a functional guideline for state em-
powerment of municipal zoning, up until 1926, the United States
Supreme Court had not yet pronounced itself on the constitutionality
of comprehensive plan zoning ordinances. This pronouncement ar-
rived when the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.79
B. General Principles of Zoning Law
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,80 the Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning ordinances for the
first time. The Court ruled that "before [a comprehensive zoning] or-
dinance can be declared unconstitutional, [its] provisions [must be]
72. The SZEA provided that the division of land into districts or "zones," "shall be
uniform for each class or kind of building throughout each district." SZEA, supra note
70, at § 53.0111](2). The drafters of the SZEA fashioned this provision with great in-
sight, as they seemed to have predicted site-specific rezoning not effectuated in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan.
73. SZEA, supra note 70, at §§ 53.0111](1)-(3).
74. ANDERSON, supra note 36, at § 2.21; LAND-UsE, supra note 2, at 41.
75. WILLAM, supra note 71, at § 18.01.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65853-65857 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:55D-12-17 (West 1991).
78. See infra notes 281-322 and accompanying text. Compare Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (finding that notice and opportunity to
be heard are minimum process due) and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters. Inc.,
426 U.S. 668 (1976) (no due process required when act is legislative). See also Associ-
ated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (no due process is
required in initiative zoning ordinance because enabling act procedural requirements
only apply to city council).
79. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
80. Id.
clearly arbitrary or unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."8 '
1. Facts of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
In Euclid, the independent municipal suburbs 2 of Euclid near
Cleveland, Ohio passed a comprehensive zoning ordinance.83 A com-
prehensive plan sets out the land use policies and zones which will be
adopted by a city.8 4 A comprehensive zoning ordinance geographi-
cally maps out the location of zones and limits the uses of land to
those provided within the zones, in conjunction with the comprehen-
sive plan.8 5 The Euclid ordinance regulated land uses and the
heights and areas of structures.8 Plaintiff Ambler Realty Company
("Ambler") owned a parcel of land which it intended to sell for in-
dustrial development.87 When the Euclid ordinance was passed, it re-
stricted Ambler's tract to residential use only.88 Whereas the
Ambler tract had a value of approximately $10,000 per acre as indus-
trial property, its value dropped to $2,500 per acre once restricted to
residential use.8 9 Ambler sought to enjoin enforcement of the Euclid
ordinance on the grounds that it deprived Ambler "of liberty and
property without due process of law."90
2. The Reasoning and Holding of Euclid
In Euclid, the Court upheld the constitutionality of comprehensive
zoning ordinances.91 The Court first determined that a comprehen-
sive zoning ordinance could only be constitutional if it found its "jus-
tification in some aspect of the police power asserted for the public
welfare."92 The Court noted that blanket constitutional determina-
81. Id. at 395.
82. The Village of Euclid was an incorporated municipality. If it had not been its
"own" city, it could not have passed such an ordinance because it would have lacked
the authority to zone. Id. at 389.
83. Id. at 379-80.
84. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 36.
85. Id
86. Id. at 380-83.
87. Id. at 384.
88. Id.
89. Id The Ambler tract was in the path of industrial development and therefore
had much greater value as industrial use than as residential use. Id.
90. Id at 367-79, 384. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that no state "shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
91. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
92. Id. Professor Haar, a renowned land use authority, criticizes the way that the
police power has degenerated into a ubiquitous power used to justify otherwise uncon-
stitutional government acts. Haar believes that the police power has become an easy
excuse to infringe upon property owners' rights. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance
With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154, 1171 (1955). See Udell v. Haas,
235 N.E.2d 897, 901 (N.Y. 1968).
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tions of zoning ordinances could not be made; rather, each ordinance
should be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis.93 The Court analogized
height and building material ordinances with zoning ordinances. 94
The Court found little difference between the two and posited that
the height-restrictive and material-restrictive ordinances upheld in
the past95 were essentially the same as comprehensive zoning ordi-
nances which restricted different land uses to specific zones.96 The
Court reasoned that restrictions on both height and materials were
passed in hopes of preventing nuisances97 and differed only from
comprehensive zoning in that comprehensive zoning ordinances re-
stricted uses in general, rather than specific, terms.9 8 Ambler argued
that whereas nuisance-preventing ordinances restricted only danger-
ous uses, the Euclid zoning ordinance restricted all uses, whether or
not offensive. The Court agreed with the distinction, but dismissed
its importance as incidental.99 The Court noted that restrictions of
innocuous uses, albeit with less general impact, had been previously
upheld.100
In response to Ambler's argument against Euclid's exercise of gen-
eral land use restrictions, the Court pointed out that the Euclid coun-
cil had not fully restricted industrial development, but rather had as
a body "presumably representing a majority of its inhabitants ... de-
termined . . . that the course of such development shall proceed
within definitely fixed lines."'101
Ambler argued against Euclid's exclusion of apartment houses,
business houses, and retail stores from residential districts.102 The
Court perceived the issue as central to the resolution of the case and
upheld the exclusion of these uses by the Euclid ordinance. 10 3 The
Court backed up its opinion by noting that a great majority of juris-
dictions favored such restrictions. 10 4 The Court legitimated the re-
93. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88.
94. Id. at 388.
95. Id at 388. See Cusack v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Reinman v. City
of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Welch
v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
96. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
97. Examples include fire, overcrowding, and the possibility of structural collapse.
Id.
98. Id. at 389.
99. Id. at 388-89.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 389.
102. Id. at 390.
103. Id. at 395.
104. Id.
striction of apartment houses and retail establishments by arguing
that such restrictions bore a "rational relation to the health and
safety of the community."'10 5
Finally, the Court ruled that a comprehensive zoning ordinance
will not be found unconstitutional unless it is "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, [and bears] no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the population."106 This rule of
law still controls today.OT
C. Miscellaneous Zoning Laws
The Euclid decision was central to the viability of modern day
comprehensive zoning ordinances. Had the Supreme Court struck
down comprehensive zoning ordinances in Euclid, modern zoning
probably would not have evolved. The fact that a zoning ordinance
has been enacted, however, does not signify that the uses in each
zone will be restricted only to those permitted by the ordinance. In-
deed, two situations often occur: (1) a use prohibited under the new
ordinance is already in effect before the ordinance is enacted, or (2) a
use technically invalid under the ordinance but compatible with the
spirit of the comprehensive plan is proposed after the ordinance is
enacted.
The first situation is defined as a "nonconforming use." 108 An ex-
ample of a nonconforming use is where a new zoning ordinance re-
stricts land to residential use, but a landowner has made use of the
land as an automobile dealership for the previous five years. In such
a situation, local zoning officials may or may not allow the use to con-
tinue, depending on the level of conflict it generates with the use lim-
itations of the new ordinance and those of the general plan. 0 9 When
a nonconforming use is allowed to continue, statutory restrictions
generally prohibit modernization and expansion of the nonconform-
105. Id. at 391. Justice Sutherland, who wrote for the Court in Euclid, even went
so far as to qualify apartment buildings as "parasite[s]," which "come very near to be-
ing nuisances." Id. at 394-95. Such a statement reflects the tremendous change in land
use planning policy which the United States has effectuated since the beginning of
zoning in the 1920s.
106. Id at 395. Ultimately, the Ambler tract was zoned for industrial use. General
Motors, Inc. built its famous Fisher-body plant on the property. CHARLES M. HAAR,
LAND-USE PLANNING 204 (3d ed. 1976).
107. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 570 (Cal. 1980). In 1976,
the California Supreme Court stated: "We conclude . . . that when an exclusionary
[zoning] ordinance is challenged under the federal due process clause, the standard of
constitutional adjudication remains that set forth in Euclid v. Ambler Co." Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 486 (Cal. 1976).
108. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 190.
109. Zoning experts are more tolerant of the nonconforming use today than they
were in the past. Id.
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ing use.110 An abandonment of the nonconforming use will usually
terminate the ability to reinstate the nonconforming use."' Intent to
abandon the use, accompanied by a period of nonuse, often serves to
show abandonment of the nonconforming use.112 Because tolerated
nonconforming uses enjoy quasi-monopolies in their respective zones,
some have criticized the toleration of nonconforming uses in anti-
trust." 3 However, nonconforming uses are not central to the applica-
tion of zoning to initiatives and referenda since they deal with the
continuation or cessation of pre-existing activities as opposed to new
activities enacted by plebiscite.
In the second situation, a landowner proposes a new use, which is
technically prohibited by the applicable zoning ordinance, but which
may be allowed under the comprehensive plan. If the new use is per-
mitted by ordinance, it is defined as a rezoning."14 Rezonings are
very controversial because they constitute a legal acknowledgment of
a use previously prohibited by ordinance. As such, the proposed use
may pose a potential danger, real or perceived, to surrounding prop-
erty values.115 The controversy spawned by rezonings indicates that
they play an important role in the initiative and referendum process.
The people can either promulgate and enact a rezoning by initiative,
or invalidate the city council's rezoning decision by referendum.
Although rezonings are site-specific (and often owner-specific), le-
gally they must be made in consideration of the comprehensive
110. See, e.g., Village of Waterford v. O'Brien, 337 N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. App. Div.
1972) (cannot add onto non-conforming use). See generally Gilbert T. Graham, Legisla-
tive Techniques for the Amortization of the Non-Conforming Use, 12 WAYNE L. REV.
435 (1966).
111. WRIGHT & GITELMAN, supra note 28, at 758-59. See also, Robert M. Anderson,
The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidean Zoning, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 214
(1959) (discussing nonconforming uses generally).
112. O'Brien, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 112. See, e.g., Dusdal v. City of Warren, 196 N.W.2d
778 (Mich. 1972) (must show intent to abandon and period of nonuse).
113. See ROHAN, supra note 13, at §§ 52A.06[I]-52A.0615]. See also LAND USE, supra
note 2, at 79 (discussing zoning as restraint on competition).
114. See ROHAN, supra note 13, at §§ 50.04[1]-50.04[4].
115. In Euclid, for example, the Ambler tract was worth much more as industrial
property than as residential property. Indeed, the value of the Ambler tract decreased
by seventy-five percent when the land was restricted to residential use. Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). Such a high percentage of decrease
in value is the cause of great anxiety among landowners. Consequently, property
value plays the preeminent role in the direct legislative zoning process. Land does not
in itself have greater value because it is zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial
use. Instead, it is the placement of the tract in the context of surrounding areas and
developments which must be examined in order to gauge the highest fair market value
of the land. In Euclid, the land was worth more as industrial property than as residen-
tial property because it was in the path of industrial development. Id.
plan.116 If the comprehensive plan is not considered in the rezoning
decision, the decision might be invalidated as "spot-zoning."117 With
spot-zoning concerns appear criticisms of political favoritism. Oppo-
nents of city councils may accuse council members of favoring devel-
opers, who are able to donate large sums as campaign funds, over the
community at large, which relies on the comprehensive plan to pro-
tect the stability of property values.118
Although zoning law is replete with regulations, restrictions, and
innovative procedures by which to effectively plan municipal land
uses,119 only comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and rezoning
ordinances are germane to the legal problems posed by initiative and
referendum zoning. Comprehensive plans usually do not pose
problems when enacted or approved by municipal voters because
they are instruments of policy rather than specific geographic restric-
tions on land use.l ' o
III. THE APPLICATION OF INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA TO THE
ZONING PROCESS
A. Initiatives and Referenda
The system of initiative and referendum evolved as a result of the
pervasive distrust of legislatures and legislative officials during the
late nineteenth century.121 At the time, many states followed the
Progressive political movement 122 and amended their constitutions' 23
116. A rezoning is itself a zoning ordinance. All zoning ordinances must be enacted
in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Therefore, all rezonings must be enacted
pursuant to a comprehensive plan. See, e.g., ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.462.01(E)
(Supp. 1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860(c) (West 1983).
117. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
118. Freilich, supra note 8, at 517.
119. Such innovative techniques include floating zones, contract zoning, cluster zon-
ing, and Planned Unit Developments. See generally WILLL4MS, supra note 71, at § 28
(floating zones), § 29 (contract zoning), § 47 (cluster zoning), § 48 (Planned Unit
Developments).
120. The problems with zoning initiatives and referenda are that they may not
meet the legislative, procedural enabling act, and comprehensive plan requirements.
These three requirements, however, do not seem to interfere with the adoption of
comprehensive plans by the general electorate of a community. There is no doubt that
the adoption of a sweeping policy instrument such as the plan is a legislative act. Pro-
cedural due process requirements, even if applied to zoning by direct legislation, are
much easier to meet than they are for zoning and rezoning ordinances enacted by pleb-
iscite because they involve policy. Lastly, it is logical that the comprehensive plan re-
quirement may not possibly interfere with the enactment of a comprehensive plan.
Freilich, supra note 8, at 546. Comprehensive plans enacted by plebiscite, therefore, do
not generate too many problems in zoning. Rather, it is zoning and rezoning ordi-
nances that are the sources of plebiscite zoning because of their conflicts with all three
legislative, enabling statute, and plan requirements.
121. See West v. City of Portage, 221 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Mich. 1974).
122. The Progressive movement began at the turn of the twentieth century, during
President William McKinley's first term of office (1897-1901). 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA
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to allow for the application of initiatives and referenda to legislative
decisions.124 One court explained that, through direct legislation,
"[t]he people could ... initiate needed laws which the Legislature
had not been bestirred to enact and could reject unpopular laws
which the Legislature, perhaps at the instance of some special inter-
est, had improvidently enacted."125 An unconstitutional ordinance,
however, cannot be validated simply because it has been enacted by
initiative or ratified by referendum.126
It is a well settled constitutional principle that direct legislative
powers of initiative and referendum are not grants of power, but
rather constitute reservations of power by the people.12 James
BRITANNICA 983-84 (15th ed. 1980). The movement was sparked by the agrarian de-
pression of the 1890s, which caused a sharp decline in agricultural prices and the eco-
nomic depression of 1893, which resulted in a greater stratification of economic classes
into rich and poor. Id. The movement was a reaction to what Progressives believed to
be an increasingly powerful tripartite alliance between big business, industry, and
political parties. Id. The rapid industrialization and consequent urbanization after the
Civil War had negatively affected conditions in the cities. Id. Poor housing conditions,
labor injustice, and the collapse of local and municipal governmental systems into
party "machines" caused Progressives to push for dramatic political changes. Id. The
goal of Progressivism was to dismantle the alliance of finance and politics, which
Progressives believed was destroying democratic principles of government and eco-
nomic opportunity for the lower economic classes. Id. Progressive policies consisted of
laissez-faire economics, a rejection of individualism for more direct democratic power,
socio-economic reform for the poor, and an enlargement of government so that the
rank and file could destroy the big business-political alliance. Id. Political infighting
among the Progressives resulted in the inability of the movement to merge into a
united political force. Id. Instead, the Progressive "movement" was composed of three
smaller movements. Id. The Progressive movement operated on the national, state,
and local levels. Id. At the local level, Progressives were led by the National Munici-
pal League, which pushed for radical direct democratic reforms in order to wrest con-
trol of municipal politics from the corrupt machines. Id. From Progressive ideals
came forth initiatives and referenda, which could be used to bypass local legislatures
and place power in the hands of the people. See Freilich, supra note 8, at 511-12. For
an overview of the Progressive movement and its policies, see generally ARTHUR STAN-
LEY LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1954) and GEORGE EDWIN
MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1958).
123. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
124. See Freilich, supra note 8, at 511-12. The rallying cry of the Progressives was
"[t]he cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy!" REFERENDUMS: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 29 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978).
Justice Black described referenda as "a classic demonstration of 'devotion to democ-
racy.'" James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). For a detailed discussion of what
constitutes a legislative act, see infra notes 149-280 and accompanying text.
125. West v. City of Portage, 221 N.W.2d 303, 304-05 (Mich. 1974), abrogation recog-
nized by Albright v. City of Portage, 470 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
126. ANDERSON, supra note 36, at § 4.25. See Poirier v. Grand Blanc Township, 423
N.W.2d 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
127. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). See infra notes 169-92
and accompanying text.
Madison wrote that a republic is a government which "derives all its
powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people."'128 It
is crucial to distinguish between the concepts of reserved and granted
powers because the concept of reserved initiative and referendum
power is a prime argument in the debate over whether state enabling
acts preclude the application of plebiscites to zoning.129 States which
have ruled that state zoning enabling act restrictions do not apply to
zoning matters enacted by direct legislation bring the distinction into
play. These states reason that since direct legislative power is re-
served rather than granted by the state, state enabling acts cannot
place restrictions upon this power, but only upon city councils that
are creations of the state. 13o Other states oppose this view. Instead,
these states argue that although popular initiative and referendum
power is withheld by the people rather than delegated to it by the
state, the applicability of initiative and referendum power to the zon-
ing process can be effectively "preempted1 31 by either specific state
statutes1 32 or by zoning enabling statutes.133 As this Comment ex-
plores problems that appear when initiatives and referenda are ap-
plied to the zoning process, only the jurisprudence of those states' 34
that allow zoning by initiative and referendum will be examined.
B. Problems With the Application of Initiatives and Referenda to
the Zoning Process
Three requirements must be met before direct electoral zoning de-
cisions may be declared valid: (1) initiatives and referenda must be
applied only to decisions that are legislative in nature;135 (2) initia-
tives and referenda must fulfill the procedural requirements of state
zoning enabling acts;136 and (3) all zoning decisions must be made in
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1937)
(emphasis added). See infra notes 416-45 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 281-322 and accompanying text.
130. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
131. RATHKOPF, supra note 20, at § 29C.03.
132. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(b) (West 1967).
133. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-14(c) (Michie 1983), interpreted in Westgate
Families v. County Clerk of Los Alamos, 667 P.2d 453 (N.M. 1983) (referenda cannot
apply to zoning); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35A.63.072 (West 1991), interpreted in Leo-
nard v. City of Bothell, 557 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1976) (only legislative bodies have zoning
powers).
134. See, e.g., AruZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, §§ 1(2)-(3); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1; ME.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. II, §§ 1(a)-(g).
Some states have explicitly prohibited the application of initiatives and referenda to
zoning. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(b) (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-14(c)
(Michie 1983). See MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SAMUEL C. PATrERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 276-77 (4th ed. 1986).
135. See infra note 140.
136. See infra notes 281-322 and accompanying text.
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consideration of a comprehensive plan. 3 7 The potential inability to
fulfill these three requirements is at the heart of the controversy be-
tween states that embrace zoning initiatives and referenda and states
that select a more representative route in zoning decision making.
The three requirements generate complex legal problems, the most
salient of which are: (1) a deep jurisdictional split on what consti-
tutes a legislative zoning act, (2) the potential inability of initiatives
and referenda to fulfill procedural requirements mandated by zoning
enabling acts, (3) the lack of regard accorded to comprehensive plan
considerations by direct legislative zoning decisions, and (4) the effec-
tiveness of a highly permissive level of judicial review of direct legis-
lative zoning decisions. In addition to the problems posed by the
three zoning requirements, there are systemic political concerns
which further complicate matters. 3 8 These concerns pit progressive
direct democratic arguments against the republican theory of repre-
sentative democracy in the debate over whether initiative and refer-
enduin powers genuinely aid in the production of valid and efficient
zoning ordinances.139
1. The Legislative Act Requirement
Because initiative and referendum power is a reservation of legisla-
tive power by the people, initiatives and referenda may be applied
only to actions that are legislative in nature.140 Initiatives and refer-
enda may neither be applied to administrative nor adjudicative func-
tions of government.141 Consequently, plebiscites may not be used to
promulgate, approve, or reject zoning decisions that are either admin-
137. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65000-66499.58 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
138. See infra notes 416-45 and accompanying text.
139. See id
140. See supra note 19. 5 E. McQuiLLAN, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIoNs § 16.55 (3d ed.
1989). Any discussion of direct legislative zoning problems must begin with a discus-
sion of the legislative act requirement. In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,
507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), the Oregon Supreme Court stated: "[a]ny meaningful decision as
to the proper scope of judicial review of a zoning decision must start with a characteri-
zation of the nature of that decision. The majority of jurisdictions state that a zoning
ordinance is a legislative act." Id. at 25-26. Initiatives and referenda may only be val-
idly applied to zoning decisions which are legislative in nature because the reserved
power of the people to enact laws is legislative in nature. In City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), the Court stated that "[in establishing legis-
lative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves the power to deal diretly with
matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature." Id at 672 (citing
Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)) (emphasis added).
141. See supra note 19.
istrative or judicial in nature.142 This uniformly accepted rule of law
is crucial to the application of direct legislation to zoning because the
distinction between legislative and administrative acts is blurred at
the local level.143 At national and state levels, legislatures generally
perform only legislative functions.144 At county and city levels, how-
ever, local legislatures often perform administrative and adjudicatory
functions in conjunction with legislative functions.145 A good exam-
ple of an administrative function that is performed by local legisla-
tive bodies is the issuance of permits and licenses.
The Supreme Court originally created the legislative-administra-
tive distinction in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equal-
ization,146 but has since given little guidance on how to distinguish
these two types of functions. In addition, the guidelines originally
given by the Court were not established in conjunction with a land
use scenario, and in fact predate the modern day concept of land use
planning and zoning by one decade. 147 Due to both a lack of high
court guidance and a divergence in direct legislative policies, states
have split on what constitutes a legislative function in the zoning pro-
cess.14s The split is generated by a variety of tests used to determine
whether an action is legislative or administrative in nature, as well as
by the variety of manners in which the tests are applied.149 States
tending to oppose widespread plebiscites have determined that only
the initial comprehensive zoning ordinance is legislative, and all ordi-
nances pursuant to the comprehensive ordinance are administrative
actions.' 5 0 Certain states strongly in favor of zoning by direct legisla-
tion have gone to such lengths as to shun characterization tests alto-
gether, and have held that all zoning decisions are inherently
legislative regardless of whether they involve the adoption of com-
prehensive plans or site-specific rezonings.151
The difficulties posed by determinations of what constitutes a legis-
lative zoning function were increased by the Supreme Court in 1976,
when the Court stated in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
142. 42 AM. JuR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 11 (1969 & Supp. 1991).
143. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 221 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Mich. 1974), abrogation
recognized by Albright v. City of Portage, 470 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
144. See id
145. See id (local legislative bodies often perform administrative functions).
146. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
147. Bi-Metallic was decided in 1915. 1& The first zoning ordinance was enacted in
1916. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The constitutional validity of zoning
ordinances was first upheld in 1926. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 193-280 and accompanying text.
149. The three tests used are: the policy creation test, the permanency test, and the
mixture of factors test. In addition, certain states have generically labeled all zoning
ordinances as legislative in nature. See infra notes 193-280 and accompanying text.
150. See Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. 1973).
151. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980).
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prisesl5 2 that state legislative characterizations of zoning acts are
binding.153 As a result, the Eastlake decision strengthened the preex-
isting jurisdictional schism concerning legislative characterizations of
zoning actions.154
a. The Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization
Decision
The legislative act characterization was borne out of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization,155 when the Court ruled that decisions of legislative
bodies that affect "more than a few people" are exempt from proce-
dural due process requirements.156 In Bi-Metallic, the Colorado State
Board of Equalization determined that all property in the City of
Denver was undervalued, and the Board uniformly increased the tax
valuation of real property by forty percent.'5 7 Bi-Metallic, a Denver
property owner, brought suit against the board of equalization, alleg-
ing that the absence of an opportunity to be heard before the board
denied Bi-Metallic mandatory due process. 5 8
The Court framed the issue as follows: "The question . . . is
whether all individuals have a constitutional right to be heard before
a matter can be decided in which all are equally concerned."159 The
opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Holmes, reasoned that
since the revaluation of property affected all property owners in
Denver, the decision by the board was legislative and therefore did
not have to comport with procedural due process requirements. 60
Holmes stated:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable
that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption .... General statutes
within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of indi-
viduals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be
heard.16 1
152. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
153. Id at 674 n.9, 678-80.
154. Freilich, supra note 8, at 529.
155. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
156. Id at 445.
157. Id at 444.
158. Id at 442-43.
159. Id at 445.
160. 1&
161. Id. The tax revaluation in Bi-Metallic affected all Denver property owners,
and was therefore ruled legislative in nature. Md Justice Holmes' characterization of a
legislative act, however, was much broader than the facts of the case allowed. Instead
of ruling that legislative acts are those which affect all individuals in a community,
Holmes suggested that although an opportunity to be heard was not
mandated for decisions which "applie[d] to more than a few people,"
redress for those affected by legislative acts was nevertheless avail-
able.162 According to Justice Holmes, redress could be obtained by
ousting from office those elected officials who made decisions against
the popular will.i6 3
The Bi-Metallic decision was the first to make the legislative-ad-
ministrative characterization.l64 Since Bi-Metallic, states have been
divided on what constitutes a legislative zoning act as opposed to an
administrative zoning act.165 In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises,166 the Supreme Court was presented with an excellent oppor-
tunity to guide states in their legislative-administrative
characterizations of zoning acts, but failed to act on this opportunity.
Instead, the Court reinforced, and even widened, the schism between
states when it ruled in Eastlake that state law characterizations of
legislative acts are binding.167 After Eastlake, the states could con-
tinue their splits, secure in the knowledge that the Court would up-
hold their individual legislative-administrative characterizations of
zoning decisions which were now "binding interpretation[s] of state
Justice Holmes stated that "where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few Peo-
ple," it is legislative in nature and therefore does not need to comport with procedural
due process requirements. Id (emphasis added). Justice Holmes' argument in Bi-Me-
tallic interlocks rather strongly with zoning initiatives and referenda. He stated:
"It]here must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go
on." Id Indeed, constant individual involvement in local ordinance enactments seems
to inhibit the efficiency of local law-making, especially in the zoning context, where
there are many zoning ordinances for each community.
162. Id at 444.
163. Id. at 445.
164. Freilich, supra note 8, at 529.
165. See, e.g., RK Dev. Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 242 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1968) (rezon-
ing is administrative act); City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972) (amendment to zoning ordinance is legislative function); Kelley v. John,
75 N.W.2d 713 (Neb. 1956) (rezoning is administrative action), overruled by Copple v.
City of Lincoln, 315 N.W.2d 628 (Neb. 1982) (rezoning is purely legislative); Aldom v.
Borough of Roseland, 127 A.2d 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (rezoning is admin-
istrative); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327 (Wash. 1972) (amendments to zon-
ing code are adjudicatory).
The Bi-Metallic analysis lives on in the tests used by the states. See Frefiich, supra
note 8, at 531. However, the facts of Bi-Metallic did not involve a zoning ordinance,
and, therefore, the decision has only limited value in the characterization of legislative
and administrative acts within the zoning context.
166. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). The Court could have decided to render state legislative
characterizations more uniform. The facts in Eaatlake were clearly sufficient to input
suggestions as to how states should determine the legislative or administrative charac-
ter of a zoning decision. Id. at 668-71. For example, the Court could have agreed with
Ohio's determination that a rezoning constituted a legislative act, but for different
reasons.
167. Id at 673-74. Actually, the Court ruled that because the power of the people is
reserved, rather than delegated by the state, the landowner's due process rights were
not violated by an unconstitutional delegation of state power. Id at 677-79.
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lawO."168
b. The Eastlake Decision
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, upholding the constitutionality of direct legislation as ap-
plied to the zoning process.169 The Court ruled that: (1) the power of
initiative and referendum is not a delegation of state power, but
rather a reservation of power by the people;170 (2) initiatives and ref-
erenda may be applied properly to acts determined by the state to be
legislative in nature;171 and (3) a legislative zoning decision made by
a plebiscite is not an improper delegation of power because initiatives
and referenda are reserved powers, and therefore, a direct legislative
zoning ordinance is violative of due process only if it is "arbitrary and
capricious, bearing no relation to the police power."172
In Eastlake, Forest City Enterprises ("Forest"), a real estate devel-
oper, purchased land zoned for light industrial use. Forest applied
for a rezoning of its tract so that it could develop the land as multi-
family use apartments.173 Before the city council could take action
on Forest's rezoning application, the electorate of the City of
Eastlake passed an initiative which required that every rezoning deci-
sion by the city council be approved by fifty-five percent of Eastlake
voters.174 The city council subsequently approved Forest's rezoning
application. When Forest later applied for permission to use part of
its land for automobile parking, the planning commission refused to
accept the Forest application because the original rezoning had not
yet been approved by Eastlake voters. 175 Forest brought suit for de-
claratory relief against Eastlake, alleging that the fifty-five percent
referendum ordinance was an "unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power to the people."'176 Both the trial court and appellate court
168. Id at 674 n.9.
169. Ironically, the landmark case of Eastlake involved a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio,
as did the watershed decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
170. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672.
171. Id. at 673-74 & n.9.
172. Id at 676. However, a zoning referendum is not an unconstitutional delegation
of state power. Id at 672-73.
173. Id at 670.
174. Id
175. Id at 671. The rezoning itself was not passed by the required 55% of Eastlake
voters. Id
176. Id
upheld the referendum ordinance. 7 7 The Ohio Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the referendum was "an improper delegation of
legislative power." 7 8 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 79
The Court delivered a three part opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger. First, the Court reiterated that initiative and referendum
powers are not a delegation of power by the government, but rather a
reservation of power by the people.180 The Court stated:
A referendum cannot... be characterized as a delegation of power .... [AIll
power derives from the people, who can delegate it to representative instru-
ments which they create. In establishing legislative bodies, the people can re-
serve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might
otherwise be assigned to the legislature. 18 1
Second, after the Court reiterated that initiatives and referenda
may only be properly applied to legislative acts, it stated that direct
legislation may be applied to actions which the state determines to be
legislative in nature. 8 2 Since the Ohio Supreme Court's "binding in-
terpretation of state law"183 had determined that rezonings are legis-
lative in nature, 84 it was appropriate to apply a referendum to a
rezoning in the case at bar.
Third, the Court ruled that the referendum's application to the re-
zoning did not violate due process. 8 5 The Court reasoned that since
the power of initiative and referendum is a legislative power, the
level of due process which it must accord is similar to that accorded
to legislatures. 8 6 In a footnote, the Court stated its belief that voters
are no more capricious in their referendum votes than their elected
legislative representatives. 87 The Court added that is not so much
177. Forest City Enters., Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 324 N.E.2d 740, 747 (Ohio 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that "[a] reasonable use
of property, made possible by appropriate legislative action, may not be made depen-
dant upon the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable whims of the voting public." Id.
at 746.
178. Id. at 743.
179. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 423 U.S. 890 (1975).
180. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672.
181. Id. (citing Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)); THE FEDERALIST No. 39
(James Madison).
182. Id. The Court noted that the power of referendum was specifically reserved to
the people by the Ohio State Constitution. Id. (citing OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1f).
183. Id. at 674 n.9.
184. I
185. Id. at 676.
186. Id. at 675-76.
187. Id. at 675 n.10. The Court stated: "ITihere is no more advance assurance that a
legislative body will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards than there is
with respect to voters." Id This statement by the Court seems to reflect a somewhat
Progressive idea that legislators' determinations and legal enactments are no more cor-
rect and consistent than that of the people. The argument evokes a fictional belief
that the will of the people is flawless, and that determinations of its potential invalid-
ity should be made only after the people have had the chance to directly vote on an
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the level of process that decides the due process issue, but rather the
substantive result of the referendum. 88 Citing Euclid, the Court fi-
nally ruled that the result of a rezoning referendum may be struck
down as a violation of due process only if it is "arbitrary and capri-
cious, bearing no substantial relation to the police power."' 8 9 In the
Court's opinion, therefore, the "potential for arbitrariness in the pro-
cess" did not violate due process unless the result of a zoning plebi-
scite itself could be shown to constitute a clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable action. 9 0 Consequently, a landowner whose land was
rezoned or refused a rezoning by referendum could seek redress by
either obtaining a variance, or showing that the plebiscite constituted
clearly arbitrary action. 191
The Court in Eastlake made it clear that state characterizations of
zoning acts as legislative or administrative are binding.192 However,
because the Court provided no guidelines to aid in state characteriza-
tions of zoning decisions, it reinforced the preexisting split among
states on the issue.
2. Different State Court Interpretations of What Constitutes a
Legislative v. Administrative Zoning Action
States utilize a variety of tests to determine whether a city council
zoning decision is legislative or administrative in nature. It is gener-
ally accepted that the adoption of comprehensive plans are legislative
in nature.193 Instead, the split among states centers on whether a
zoning amendment or "rezoning" is a legislative or administrative ac-
tion. Most states have ruled that rezonings are legislative in nature,
and therefore are subject to plebiscites.194 A minority of states, how-
issue. Courts are turning away from such Progressive beliefs and have begun ruling
that the will of the people does not always fulfill the procedural and policy require-
ments of comprehensive plans. See, e.g., Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Wal-
nut Creek, 802 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1990) (zoning initiative was void ab initio because did not
comport with comprehensive plan); Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of
Honolulu, 777 P.2d 244 (Haw. 1989) (initiative and referendum incompatible with zon-
ing because unable to produce uniform zoning in accordance with comprehensive
plan).
188. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 675 n.10.
189. Id. at 676.
190. Id
191. Id at 679 n.13.
192. Id at 673.
193. RATHKOPF, supra note 20, at § 29C.03 - 29C.15.
194. See the following states and cases:
California: Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980) (all zoning
matters except variances and special use permits are legislative).
ever, have ruled that rezonings are administrative and therefore not
valid matters for direct legislation.195 States characterize legislative
and administrative acts by way of different arguments and tests. The
most prevalent of these tests is the "policy creation" test.196 Another
test that has been applied is the "permanency test."'' 9 Some states
have used a mixture of tests to characterize zoning acts.s98 Finally,
certain states have altogether abandoned the use of characterization
tests, labeling all zoning actions as legislative in nature. 99
a. The Policy Creation v. Policy Implementation Test
Most states have used the policy creation test to determine
whether a zoning act is legislative or administrative in nature.20 If
an action creates policy, the state will view it as legislative in nature,
Colorado: Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981) (zoning and rezoning or-
dinances are legislative).
Florida: Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983) (rezon-
ing ordinances, like zoning ordinances, are legislative).
Maryland: Anne Arundel County v. McDonough, 354 A.2d 788 (Md. 1976) (rezoning is
legislative act).
Michigan: Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Burton, 310 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981) (single-tract rezoning is legislative act).
Minnesota: Denny v. City of Duluth, 202 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1972) (rezoning amend-
ments are the same as zoning ordinances and are legislative).
Missouri: State ex rel. Hickman v. City Council, 690 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(rezoning is legislative act).
Nebraska: Copple v. City of Lincoln, 315 N.W.2d 628 (Neb. 1982) (rezoning is legislative
in nature).
Ohio: Peachtree Dev. Co. v. Paul, 423 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio 1981) (rezoning approval of
Planned Unit Development is legislative act).
Oklahoma: Hubbard v. Oklahoma, 58 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1936) (rezoning is legislative).
Oregon: Allison v. Washington County, 548 P.2d 188 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (rezoning is
legislative for application to direct legislation).
195. Many have disagreed with the sweeping characterization of all rezonings as
legislative. See Mark A. Nitikman, Note, Instant Planning - Land Use Regulation by
Initiative in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 497 (1988); Peter G. Glenn, State Law Limi-
tations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection With Zoning Amend-
ments, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 265 (1978). See the following states and cases:
Idaho: Gumprecht v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 661 P.2d 1214 (Idaho 1983) (comprehen-
sive zoning requirements incompatible with direct legislative process).
Kansas: Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978) (rezonings can be
quasi-judicial instead of legislative).
Nevada: Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Market, Inc., 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. 1973) (re-
zoning was administrative).
Washington: Leonard v. Bothell, 557 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1976) (rezoning not legislative
in nature).
West Virginia: State ex rel MacQueen v. City of Dunbar, 278 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1981)
(direct legislation disallowed for zoning ordinances but not for rezonings).
196. See infra notes 200-25 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 236-52 and accompanying text.
200. See West v. City of Portage, 221 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. 1974), abrogation recog-
nized by Albright v. City of Portage, 470 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Kelley v.
John, 75 N.W.2d 713 (Neb. 1956), overruled by Copple v. City of Lincoln, 315 N.W.2d
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whereas if it implements policy, the state will label it administra-
tive.20 Under the policy creation test, the adoption of a comprehen-
sive plan is legislative because it involves the creation of land use
policy.202 The policy creation test considers the enactment of specific
zoning or rezoning ordinances administrative in nature because they
merely implement the policies of a plan.203
The policy creation test may be fairly described as a restatement or
extension of Holmes's Bi-Metallic test.2 0 4 The Bi-Metallic test posits
that "rules of conduct"205 that impact "more than a few people"2 6
are legislative in character, whereas actions that impact only a few
people are administrative in nature. 0o The policy creation test is ba-
sically the same as the Bi-Metallic test, but facilitates its application.
Under the policy creation test, courts classify decisions that affect
many people as policy decisions, whereas courts classify acts that af-
fect only a few people as decisions which simply implement laws.2 0 s
Ostensibly, if a zoning action creates policy, it will affect many peo-
ple, whereas it will affect comparably few people if it merely imple-
ments the zoning plan in specific zones.
The policy creation test seems to have undergone a subtle two-part
evolution. The original policy creation test involved a determination
of whether an action created or merely executed law.20 9 The modern
version of the policy creation test is more restrictive and grants legis-
lative status only to acts which create policy.210 The original policy
creation test involving zoning ordinances was first enunciated by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Kelley v. John.211 Kelley involved the
628 (Neb. 1982) (zoning amendment is purely legislative); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty
Drugs & Markets, Inc., 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. 1973).
201. See id.
202. I&
203. Kelley, 75 N.W.2d at 715.
204. See supra notes 146-63 and accompanying text.
205. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (em-




208. See supra note 200.
209. Kelley v. John, 75 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Neb. 1956), overruled by Copple v. City of
Lincoln, 315 N.W.2d 628 (Neb. 1982).
210. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 516 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Nev.
1973) (adopting the test quoted in Denman v. Quin, 116 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938)).
211. Kelley was expressly overruled in Copple v. City of Lincoln, 315 N.W.2d 628,
630 (Neb. 1982). Whereas Kelley ruled that rezonings are administrative because they
do not create law, but merely implement it, Copple ruled that a zoning amendment is a
rezoning of a tract of land from residential to commercial use.212 Af-
ter the city council approved the rezoning, voters petitioned for a ref-
erendum election on the rezoning. Once a referendum date was set,
a landowner brought an action to enjoin the election. 213 After it
noted that only legislative acts were proper matters for direct legisla-
tion, the Nebraska Supreme Court asserted that an ordinance which
creates law is legislative in nature, whereas an ordinance which exe-
cutes or administers law is administrative. 214 The court stated, "The
crucial test for determining that which is legislative from that which
is administrative or executive is whether the action taken was one
making a law, or executing or administering a law already in exist-
ence."215 The court posited that although the adoption of a compre-
hensive plan is legislative, an amendment to the plan by way of a
rezoning is administrative because it executes the plan.216 Thereaf-
ter, the court ruled that because the rezoning was administrative in
nature, it was not subject to referendum.217
The scope of the policy creation test was restricted after Kelley.2 18
The test changed from an analysis of whether the decision created
law to whether the decision created policy. Whereas legislative acts
were those that previously created law, only acts that created policy
were deemed legislative after Kelley. Ostensibly, those laws that
neither created policy nor implemented laws were characterized as
administrative. Such was the case in Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs
and Markets, Inc. ,219 where a drugstore corporation sought to rezone
its parcel from residential to commercial use in order to build a mini
shopping center.220 After the city council granted the rezoning, the
city electorate promulgated an initiative which effectively "re-re-
zoned" the tract.221 The new rezoning imposed area regulations upon
commercial uses in the zone, which prevented the drugstore from
purely legislative act. Id. The policy creation test nevertheless remains in use. See
supra note 210 and accompanying text.
212. Kelley, 75 N.W.2d at 714-15.
213. Id. at 715.
214. Id.
215. Id. (emphasis added). Kelley did not cite the Supreme Court's opinion in Bi-
Metallic, but referred to Justice Holmes's characterization of legislative acts as those
which affect a large number of people when it stated that "the changes in classification
of particular pieces of property, very rarely [affect] all the electors of a municipality."
Id. at 716.
216. Id. at 715.
217. Id. at 716.
218. See supra note 210.
219. 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. 1973). See also West v. City of Portage, 221 N.W.2d 303, 310
(Mich. 1974) (rezoning is legislative in form but administrative in substance because it
implements rather than creates policy), abrogation recognized by Albright v. City of
Portage, 470 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
220. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 516 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Nev.
1973).
221. Id.
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making use of its land in the manner approved by the city council.-
The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the initiative improperly ap-
plied to a rezoning that was an administrative, rather than a legisla-
tive, function of the city council authority.223 In its reasoning, the
court stated:
[Whether or not the citizens of a state wish to embark upon a policy of zon-
ing... within fixed areas is a legislative matter subject to referendum. But
when ... such policy has been determined and the changing of such areas, or
the granting of exceptions has been committed to the planning commission
and the city council in order to secure the uniformity necessary to the accom-
plishment of the purposes of the comprehensive zoning ordinance, such action
is administrative, and not referable.2 2 4
Use of the policy creation test as a determinant of whether a local
legislature's function is legislative or administrative is widespread. 225
Nevertheless, certain states utilize another test, the "permanency
test," to characterize the nature of local legislatures' actions.
b. The Permanent v. Temporary Distinction Test
The "permanency test" characterizes the legislative or administra-
tive actions of city councils based upon the resulting permanency of
the action. If a zoning action has a permanent impact upon the com-
munity, it is characterized as legislative, whereas if its impact is tem-
porary, the action is labeled administrative in nature.
State ex rel. Hickman v. City Council cogently exemplifies the per-
manency test.2 26 In Hickman, a married couple, the Hickmans,
sought to purchase an abandoned school and develop it into a small
shopping center.227 The contract for sale was contingent on a rezon-
ing from residential to commercial use.228 When the city council de-
222. Id. The new ordinance, enacted by initiative, prohibited industrial and com-
mercial land uses within 300 feet of elementary or junior high schools. Id Since a
grammar school was within 300 feet of the drug store tract, the initiative ordinance
would have effectively prevented the drug store from erecting its intended mini-mall.
Id.
223. Id at 1237.
224. Id (emphasis added). The court's final determination concerning the rezoning
as an administrative act was influenced by the argument that it is necessary to curtail
the use of direct legislation in certain zoning matters for the comprehensive plan to be
truly uniform. Id Ostensibly, the court did not believe that the general electorate of a
community could fuse the policy of a comprehensive plan with more microscopic
neighborhood concerns.
225. See supra note 200.
226. 690 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. App. 1985). See also Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d
772, 778 (Or. 1975) (legislative acts are permanent; administrative acts are temporary).
227. Hickman, 690 S.W.2d at 800.
228. Id
nied the rezoning, the Hickmans circulated petitions in order to have
the rezoning denial referred to the community's electorate.229
Although the Hickmans collected a sufficient number of signatures,
the city refused to place the rezoning on referendum.23 0 The
Hickmans petitioned for relief by way of mandamus. The Court of
Appeals for the Western District of Missouri ruled that the rezoning
ordinance was a legislative act and, therefore, an appropriate subject
for referendum.23 1 The court utilized the permanency test to deter-
mine whether an act was legislative or administrative in nature.232
The court stated that actions which are permanent in their impact
are legislative, whereas actions that are temporary in impact are ad-
ministrative.23 3 On this basis, the court reasoned that decisions
which set out comprehensive plans are legislative in nature because
they are permanent, whereas decisions that execute or implement a
plan are administrative because they are temporary in impact.23
The court concluded that since rezonings amend comprehensive zon-
ing ordinances rather than implement the initial comprehensive plan,
they are legislative in nature and, therefore, are appropriate matters
for plebiscite.2 35
c. Blanket Labeling of all Zoning Actions as Legislative
While certain states utilize the policy creation test and others use
the permanency test, some states have dispensed with the use of tests
altogether. Instead, these states have uniformly labeled all zoning
actions as legislative. This blanket classification practice must be dis-
tinguished from other courts that have found rezonings to be legisla-
tive. While certain states have ruled that rezonings are legislative
acts, most have done so either on the basis of the permanency or pol-
icy creation tests.23 6 States such as California,237 which have generi-
229. Id
230. Id.
231. Id at 803.
232. Id. at 802. Although the court considered the permanency of the rezoning ac-
tion, it did not consider this the sole factor, but also considered the policy aspect of the
action. Id
233. Id.
234. Id. at 802-03.
235. Id at 803. This seems to have been one of the first instances where a court
shifted from an objective characterization of zoning towards a blanket label, as used in
California. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980) (since
the zoning process is inherently legislative, all zoning acts are legislative except vari-
ances and special use permits). As in Hickman, courts that label all zoning acts with
the blanket characterization of "legislative" almost uniformly extend the argument
that since the comprehensive zoning ordinance is legislative, so too are amendments to
it which result in a new comprehensive plan. See id.; see also Duran v. Cassidy, 104
Cal. Rptr. 793 (Ct. App. 1972) (passage of general plan is legislative, so amendment to
plan is also legislative).
236. See supra notes 200-35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19: 99, 1991] Land Use By, For, and Of the People
PEPPERDNE LAW REVIEW
cally labeled all zoning acts= as legislative, have done so without the
use of tests and without considering whether the zoning action is the
enactment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance or a site-specific re-
zoning amendment.239 Instead, these states have posited that since a
plan is legislative, a rezoning amendment to a plan is also
legislative.m4
The "blanket labeling" approach is well exemplified by the Califor-
nia case of Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa.241 In Arnel,
a landowner, Arnel, sought to develop a fifty acre tract for residential
use as single-family homes and high density apartments.24 2 A com-
munity group opposed the impending development and passed an ini-
tiative which rezoned the tract2 4 3 to only single-family use. The
rezoning initiative effectively prevented Arnel's proposed develop-
ment scheme. Arnel filed suit to invalidate the initiative. The trial
court upheld the rezoning initiative, but the appellate court re-
versed.24 The California Supreme Court ruled that all zoning ac-
tions are legislative, and that such a blanket labeling does not violate
the federal Constitution.245 The court concluded that the rezoning
was therefore properly enacted by initiative.246 The court reasoned
that if a zoning ordinance is legislative, then an amendment to it
should also be legislative in nature.2 4 7 The court stated, "The amend-
ment of a legislative act is itself a legislative act."248 This argument
237. See Arnel, 620 P.2d at 565.
238. Id California has characterized all zoning acts as legislative, apart from vari-
ances and special use permits. See San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council,
529 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1974) (finding variances and special use permits adjudicatory in
nature).
239. Professor Freilich has described this practice as a "categorial approach" to-
ward legislative characterizations. Freilich, supra note 8, at 533. Freilich writes: "In
contrast to an approach which examines the substantive nature of the decision, some
jurisdictions rely on the nature of the governmental proceeding to determine the type
of action." Id
240. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980).
241. Id
242. Id at 567.
243. The initiative also rezoned an adjoining tract of land owned by South Coast
Plaza, which consolidated with Arnel Development Company as a single party plaintiff
for both trial and appeal. Id, at 566 n.2.
244. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 159 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd,
620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980).
245. Arnel, 620 P.2d at 571. All zoning actions are legislative in California, except
subdivision approvals, variances and special use permits, which are adjudicatory in na-
ture. Id at 569-70 (quoting Horn v. County of Ventura, 718 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1979)).
246. Id at 571.
247. Id at 569.
248. Id. (quoting Johnston v. City of Claremont, 323 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1958)).
is used by each of the states that label all zoning acts as legislative in
nature.249
The court also based its conclusion on the Supreme Court's opinion
in Eastlake, which upheld Ohio's "binding interpretation of state
law" that a rezoning is legislative in nature.2 5 0 The California
Supreme Court reasoned that if Ohio's determination that a rezoning
is a legislative act was constitutionally valid, then California's "ge-
neric" classification of all zoning actions as legislative acts should also
be valid.251
Generic classifications are helpful because they dispense with the
bothersome application of tests to determine whether an action is
truly legislative in substance. Nevertheless, generic classifications
are troubling because they seem to create a legal fiction. Although a
rezoning might be administrative in substance, it becomes character-
ized as legislative for the purpose of legal expediency. Additionally,
the rezoning becomes the pro-initiative policy of the state when it is
summarily labeled as legislative in nature. One federal circuit court
noted the problem posed by such generic labeling when it wrote, in
dicta, that "it is not labels [but substance] that determines whether
an action is legislative or adjudicative."252 Indeed, cases which sum-
marily label all zoning acts as legislative are devoid of any meaning-
ful analysis on the merits of the case-specific facts. Instead, the
generic label appears to be a translation of policy into case rulings
which are favorable to initiatives and referenda, instead of true anal-
yses which determine whether a particular action is legislative in
substance. It seems that the most correct non-policy oriented analy-
sis of whether a rezoning action is legislative in character comes with
the use of a combination of tests, because the tests can be used to ac-
tually determine whether a zoning amendment is legislative or ad-
ministrative in substance based upon the facts at bar.
249. See supra note 235.
250. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.9 (1976). It is in
light of this blanket labeling practice that one can clearly discern the effect of
Eastlake's reliance on state characterizations of legislative acts. Had Eastlake not
placed such controlling reliance upon the state legislative characterization process, it is
doubtful that the California Supreme Court could have labeled all zoning actions as
legislative acts.
251. Ar'nel, 620 P.2d at 570. The California court labeled all zoning actions as legis-
lative, except variances, special use permits, and subdivision approvals. Id at 572 &
n.11. The only true difference between a variance and a rezoning is that a variance is
not mapped into the plan, whereas a rezoning is mapped. A variance is like a rezoning
ordinance which is not enacted, but whose power to bind remains. Perhaps the court
felt that it could not push its legislative label fiction too far by also finding variances
and special use permits legislative. See ANDERSON, supra note 36, at § 6.59.
252. Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1988).
Curiously, the court found that zoning of the small tract at issue in the case was legis-
lative in nature. Id.
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d. Combination of Factors Analysis
Certain states, such as Colorado, have employed a combination of
tests, rather than a single test, in order to determine the nature of
the local legislature's actions.=S Such a mixture of factors provides
the advantage of a substantive analysis into whether an action is
truly legislative. Utilizing a combination of tests seems to weed out
the possibility of imposing a legal fiction, such as the blanket charac-
terization in Arnel.
The Colorado Supreme Court used a combination of three tests to
determine whether an amendment to a city lease was legislative or
administrative. In Witcher v. Canon City, the Colorado Supreme
Court ruled that an amendment to a city lease agreement was an ad-
ministrative action by the city council. 5 4 The court used a mixture
of three tests to come to its conclusion: (1) whether the amendment
was permanent or temporary, (2) whether the amendment created
policy or simply implemented such policy, and (3) whether the origi-
nal action was legislative.2m The court determined that the amend-
ment was administrative because it was: (1) temporary rather than
permanent, (2) implemented rather than created policy, and (3) an
amendment of a previous action which was itself administrative in
nature.2 56
Because each of the three factors used by the Witcher court indi-
cated that the amendment was legislative, it is not clear how the
court would have resolved the question if the results of the three
tests had conflicted. In such a situation, one of the factors would
most likely be found determinative. A determinative factor among
253. Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d 445 (Colo. 1986).
254. Id. at 447-48. Although Witcher was not a zoning case, it may be closely analo-
gized to the zoning amendment process of determining whether an amendment to a
zoning ordinance constitutes a legislative act. Instead of an amendment to a zoning or-
dinance, Witcher involved the issue of whether an amendment of a lease may properly
be referred to voters as a legislative act. In Witcher, Canon City leased park lands to
Lon Piper, subject to construction by Piper of a suspension bridge across a neighboring
gorge. I. at 447. The Royal Gorge Company subsequently purchased the lease. Id.
The city amended the lease to permit Royal Gorge to withhold five percent of the
city's bridge tolls in order to improve the bridge and extend its useful life. I Canon
City voters who opposed the amendment petitioned for a referendum on the issue. Id
at 448. The city council rejected the referendum petition on the ground that amending
the lease was an administrative, rather than legislative, act, and thus could not be sub-
ject to direct legislation. Id The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that amending the
lease constituted an administrative act and, therefore, was not referable to the voters.
I at 457.
255. Id at 449-50.
256. i at 450-51.
other lesser important factors would promote the possibility of a
legal fiction in the court's reasoning because the factor in disagree-
ment would probably be the third-namely, the legislative or admin-
istrative nature of the initial action. If the initial action were found
to be legislative, then any actions pursuant to it would also be legisla-
tive, regardless of the factors of permanency and policy creation.
In sum, it appears that the characterization that all zoning acts are
legislative, whether by policy creation test, permanency test or ge-
neric legislative characterization, is inherently flawed unless each
zoning action is analyzed on its particular factual merits by a combi-
nation of factors, none of which should be accorded determinative
status. Any classification of rezonings by a method other than a fact-
specific determination propels the transformation of a land use fic-
tion into law. The Oregon Supreme Court, in a lucid opinion deliv-
ered in 1972, prior to the Eastlake decision and the subsequent advent
of the enormous present day jurisdictional split, pointed out the fan-
tasy involved in a uniform classification of zoning actions as legisla-
tive acts. In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,257 the
Oregon Supreme Court stated that it "would be ignoring reality to
rigidly view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legisla-
tive acts to be accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded
from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of
powers."258 In Eastlake, dissenter Justice Stevens was joined by Jus-
tice Brennan. The two Justices opposed the majority's reliance on
Ohio's determination that a rezoning constitutes a legislative act.259
Justice Stevens wrote, "I think it is equally clear that the popular
vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of indi-
vidual litigants."260 One authority attacks the characterization of
rezonings as legislative on policy grounds and states that rezonings
were never intended to be directly legislated by city residents.2 61
The author writes, "Small-scale zoning decisions are hardly the type
of government decisions for which direct legislation was designed."262
Oregon has approached the legislative characterization issue with
great judicial finesse by characterizing the adoption of comprehensive
257. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1972), superceded by statute as stated in Neuberger v. City of
Portland, 603 P.2d 771 (Or. 1979), disapproved on other grounds in Neuberger v. City
of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980).
258. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). Instead of classifying the Fasano rezoning as legis-
lative, the court found that the rezoning constituted a judicial exercise of the local leg-
islative body's authority. Id. Fasano was a landmark in zoning law in the area ofjudicial review, which constitutes another element in the long list of problems posed
by direct legislative zoning.
259. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 692 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 693 (emphasis added) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. See Glenn, supra note 195, at 305.
262. Id.
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plans as legislative, but characterizing the adoption of site-specific
zonings as quasi-judicial, rather than legislative or administrative. In
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that site-specific zoning ordinances are judicial in nature,
and require a higher level of review than legislative acts.2 m In
Fasano, landowner defendants sought to have their land rezoned
from single-family residential to planned residential use in order to
develop the land as a mobile home park.2 4 Although the planning
commission did not vote in favor of the rezoning, the Board of
County Commissioners (the "Board") approved the rezoning. Plain-
tiffs, who owned neighboring land, opposed the zone change. The
trial court invalidated the rezoning on the ground that the Board had
not shown sufficient changes in the neighborhood to allow a rezon-
ing.265 The appellate court affirmed, noting that the rezoning was in-
consistent with the comprehensive plan, which designated the land as
single-family residential.6 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed
and struck down the rezoning. 267
The supreme court first reiterated that judicial review of zoning
decisions must begin by a characterization of the nature of the partic-
ular action because local legislatures do not always function on the
same level as national legislative bodies.268 The court then reasoned
that a realistic characterization of zoning decisions cannot uniformly
label all zoning acts as legislative in nature.269 The court asserted
that while comprehensive plans are adopted by legislative authority,
site-specific rezonings are instead effectuated via judicial authority
and therefore deserve a higher level of review than legislative deci-
sions.2 0 The court stated:
[The adoption of] general policies without regard to a specific piece of prop-
erty [is] usually an exercise of legislative authority ... [and] may only be at-
tacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On
the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific
piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial author-
ity and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test.2 7 1
The court determined that since the city's rezoning ordinance was
263. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26-27.
264. Id. at 25.
265. Id.
266. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 489 P.2d 693 (Or. Ct. App. 1971), off'd,
507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
267. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30.
268. Id. at 26.
269. Id. See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.
270. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
site-specific, it constituted a judicial act.272 As such, the property
owner seeking the change had the burden of proof to show that the
rezoning was valid.2 73 The court emphasized that the burden of
proof increased proportionately to the degree of land use change ef-
fectuated by the rezoning.2 74 The court announced a four-part test to
determine the validity of the judicial act under scrutiny: (1) there
must be a public need for the change in land use, (2) the need must
be best served by the rezoning proposed, (3) an increase in the degree
of change will similarly increase the burden of showing that the im-
pact of the change was carefully considered, and (4) if a rezoning for
the proposed use has already been considered with respect to other
areas, the party proposing the change in use must show that the site
in controversy is the best place for the rezoning.2 75 The Oregon
Supreme Court concluded that the parties proposing the rezoning
had not met the burden of proof, and affirmed the appellate court's
judgment.276 Legislation enacted in the years following Fasano grad-
ually added restrictions upon rezonings so as to make the safeguards
afforded in Fasano unnecessary. 277 The Oregon Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the four-part test set forth in Fasano was largely
superceded by statutes as announced in Neuberger v. City of
Portand.278
By characterizing site-specific rezonings as judicial rather than leg-
islative acts, Oregon effectively maintained a high degree of control
over zoning decisions.279 In its day, the Fasano decision granted a
high degree of control to the state in the rezoning process by virtue
of the fact that subsequent rezonings merited very strict burdens of
proof, rather than the highly permissive "arbitrary or capricious"
standard for legislative acts. The Fasano decision, however, did not
invalidate direct electoral involvement in the zoning process because
the Oregon Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Allison v. Wash-
ington County that rezonings, although considered judicial for pur-
poses of judicial review, are considered legislative acts for the
purposes of initiative and referendum.28 0
In sum, only legislative acts may properly be the subject of initia-
272. Id. at 29.
273. I&
274. Id.
275. Id. This test was largely overruled in Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d
771 (Or. 1979), where the Oregon Supreme Court stated that subsequent legislation
provided adequate protections. Id. at 778-79. See infra text accompanying notes 277-
278.
276. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30.
277. Neuberger, 603 P.2d at 778-79.
278. Id.
279. See infra notes 405-410 and accompanying text.
280. 548 P.2d 188, 197 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
[Vol. 19: 99, 1991] Land Use By, For, and Of the People
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tives or referenda, and states are split on whether a rezoning amend-
ment constitutes a legislative or administrative act. Once controlling
state law determines a zoning action to constitute a legislative act,
however, another difficulty for direct legislative zoning appears-the
potential inability of initiatives and referenda to fulfill the proce-
dural requirements mandated by state zoning enabling acts.
3. Zoning Enabling Act Requirements
Each state that allows municipal zoning does so via a state zoning
enabling act. The enabling act delegates zoning power from the state
to its municipalities. Most modern enabling acts can be traced to the
original SZEA of 1926.281 The SZEA, as do most present-day en-
abling statutes, required that notice and an opportunity to be heard
be given to landowners whose land was to be zoned.28 2 These proce-
dural due process requirements are mandated not only by state zon-
ing enabling acts, but also by well established general Supreme Court
due process precedent. However, minimum procedural due pro-
cess is fulfilled whenever a legislature enacts law.2 84 Therefore, since
direct legislative action is borne out of the people's reserved legisla-
281. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
282. SZEA, supra note 70, at § 4. The SZEA provided:
The legislative body of such municipality shall provide for the manner in
which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of such districts
shall be determined, established, and enforced, and from time to time
amended, supplemented, or changed. However, no such regulation, restric-
tion, or boundary shall become effective until after a public hearing in rela-
tion thereto, at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an
opportunity to be heard. At least 15 days notice of the time and place of such
hearing shall be published in an official paper, or a paper of general circula-
tion, in such municipality.
Id.
283. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In
Mullane, the Court stated that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process... is notice reasonably calculated ... to apprise interested parties of the pen-
dency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at
314. Due process requirements are not mere formalities. In Mullane, the Court added
that "when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due pro-
cess." Id, at 315. For a general overview of procedural due process principles, see
JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 13.8 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
284. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)
(no procedural due process for legislative acts). Although procedural due process is a
constitutional requirement whenever state action exists, procedural due process is
deemed to be given in full when the legislature enacts law. Constitutional scholars
Nowak, Rotunda and Young write: "When a legislature passes a law which affects a
general class of persons, those persons have all received procedural due process - the
legislative process." NOWAK, supra note 283, at 485. See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMEm-
tive power,28 5 direct legislative zoning is deemed to fulfill minimum
constitutional procedural due process requirements. In fact, the
Eastlake majority went so far as to hold that it is not the level of pro-
cess granted by the plebiscite itself which controls, but rather
whether the substantive result of the plebiscite violates due pro-
cess.28s Eastlake held that the result of a direct legislative zoning de-
cision violates due process only if it is "arbitrary or capricious,
bearing no relation to the police power."28 7 Thus, minimum constitu-
tional procedural due process considerations do not enter the initia-
tive and referendum debate until the substantive result is "arbitrary
or capricious."
Nevertheless, although a state may not give less protection to its
citizens than provided by the U.S. Constitution, it may provide
greater protection.28 8 Many state zoning enabling acts, guided by the
SZEA, statutorily mandate that municipalities grant actual notice
and an opportunity to be heard to landowners whose land will be
zoned, rather than merely satisfy minimum constitutional procedural
due process, which is fulfilled whenever a legislative body makes
law.289 Most states have fully bypassed the due process requirement
issue.290 Certain states have effectively "preempted" the issue of
whether direct legislation actually fulfills due process require-
ments.291 These states have instead bypassed the procedural due pro-
cess issue and ruled that the added due process requirements of state
enabling acts are applicable only to city councils and not to the direct
legislative process. Other states have failed to reach the due process
issue because they have initially found that the grant of power to mu-
nicipalities in state enabling acts is exclusive of direct legislation and
instead applies only to city councils. 292 Consequently, these states
have prohibited zoning by plebiscite.
One state which has held that due process requirements do not ap-
ply to the initiative process is California.293 In Associated Home
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-7 to 10-19 (2d ed. 1988) (procedural due process gener-
ally) [hereinafter TRIBE].
285. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (people's reserved power of direct
legislation is legislative).
286. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976).
287. I& (citing City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
288. Constitutional scholars refer to this theory as the "doctrine of adequate and
independent state grounds." The doctrine is, however, much more complex than this
general statement implies. For an overview of the doctrine, see generally TRIBE, aupra
note 284, at §§ 3-22 to 3-24.
289. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65853-85857 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
290. RATHKOPF, supra note 20, at § 29C.03[3].
291. Id.
292. Id, See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal.
1976) (hearing and opportunity to be heard procedural due process requirements of
zoning enabling act not applicable to zoning initiatives and referenda).
293. Notably, California is also the pro-initiative and referendum zoning state
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Builders v. City of Livermore,294 the California Supreme Court ex-
pressly overruled 295 its past precedent of Hurst v. City of Burlin-
game296 and ruled that the California statutes that required notice
and an opportunity to be heard before a city council may enact a zon-
ing ordinance do not apply to zoning by initiative.2 97 In Associated
Home Builders, the residents of the city of Livermore enacted an ini-
tiative ordinance which prohibited new building permits until munic-
ipal school overcrowding was reduced, municipal sewage treatment
plants attained regional standards, and local water rationing was ter-
minated.2 9 8 The building restriction affected Associated Home Build-
ers, who brought suit to enjoin the ordinance.299 The trial court
struck down the ordinance on the ground that it violated state zoning
statutes, which required notice and a hearing by the planning com-
mission and city council3 00 prior to passage of zoning ordinances by
city councils.3o1
The California Supreme Court ruled that enabling act due process
requirements did not apply to zoning initiatives.3o 2 First, the court
determined that the state legislature had never intended for the zon-
ing enabling statute to apply to zoning ordinances passed by initia-
tive, but only to those passed by city councils.30 3 Second, the court
noted that California had amended its constitution in 1911 to reserve
the power of initiative to its citizens.30 4 The constitutional amend-
ment provided that the legislature could pass laws to facilitate such
which has upheld the validity of the generic classifications of all zoning acts as legisla-
tive in nature. See supra notes 237-251 and accompanying text. But see Lesher Com-
munications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1990) (zoning initiative
void ab initio because it did not comport with comprehensive plan). California is one
of the states that seems to have turned away from its pro-plebiscite zoning policy. See
inira notes 386-400 and accompanying text.
294. 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
295. Id. at 480.
296. 277 P. 308 (Cal. 1929).
297. Associated Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 479-80. See supra note 107 and accompa-
nying text.
298. Associated Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 476. The electorate believed that a
causal connection existed between the amount of residential units in existence and the
problems of school overcrowding, sewage blockage, and water rationing. Id. at 476.
299. Id.
300. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65853-65857 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
301. Associated Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 476.
302. Id at 480-81.
303. Id at 479.
304. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25, amended and renumbered, art. 2, § 11
(1976)).
initiative power, but not to restrict this power.30 5 The court argued
that the application of the statutory zoning law requiring notice and a
hearing would work as a restriction of the people's initiative power
and would therefore be invalid for state constitutional conflict
reasons.306
The California rule, which finds statutory procedural due process
requirements inapplicable to zoning initiatives, is disturbing at best.
For all of its statutory and state constitutional logic, the court com-
pletely circumvented the practical aspects of the federal due process
problem. Indeed, the entire reasoning of the court in Associated
Home Builders was based on state legal principles rather than prag-
matic considerations of federal due process and fairness. It is on this
basis that the Associated Home Builders rule works as a constitu-
tional mind twister: procedural due process is required for passage of
zoning actions by a city's legislature, but not for direct legislative en-
actments by the people. If a zoning enabling act requires due process
from a city council when it passes legislative zoning ordinances, as in
Associated Home Builders, it is difficult to understand why such a re-
quirement would not apply to initiatives and referenda by the electo-
rate.30 7 After all, it is only logical that an affirmative increase in the
level of process accorded to zoning matters would be imputed to zon-
ing plebiscites.
The enabling act procedural due process requirement is rooted in
pragmatic considerations of fairness.30 8 In a dissent to the majority
opinion in Eastlake, Justice Powell warned that "the [referendum]
procedure, affording no opportunity for the affected person to be
heard ... by the electorate, is fundamentally unfair."3s 9 The due
process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard protect
landowners from the power of legislative authority in two ways.
First, the exercise of due process slows the zoning process and grants
decision makers the time to reflect upon the pending decision. 310
Second, due process requirements protect the landowner and the
community from arbitrary decisions made without sufficient informa-
tion concerning the comprehensive plan.3 1 '
States that have declined to apply direct legislation to zoning mat-
305. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25.
306. Associated Home Builder, 557 P.2d at 479-80.
307. The United States Constitution requires procedural due process to be accorded
whenever there is state action. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Supreme Court noted that the exercise of initiative and refer-
endure power by the people constitutes state action.
308. Nelson interview, supra note 46.
309. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
310. Nelson interview, supra note 46.
311. See injfa notes 323-404 and accompanying text.
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ters have done so on the grounds that initiatives and referenda are
unable to fulfill the requirements of state zoning enabling acts.3 12
These states reason that since all zoning power comes from a grant of
authority by the state via a zoning enabling act, each municipality's
zoning power is limited by the power and procedural requirements
specified in the enabling act. Therefore, if an enabling act specifi-
cally mentions that zoning ordinances shall be passed by local repre-
sentative bodies, they are interpreted as a bar to zoning by direct
electoral legislation. As one authority noted, such an argument is
ironic because it is based on the Hurst decision, which the California
Supreme Court expressly overruled in Associated Home Builders.3 '3
In Hurst, the California Supreme Court reasoned that the scope of
direct legislative zoning power was limited by that of legislative bod-
312. States which have prohibited the application of direct legislation to zoning due
to conflicts with enabling act procedural requirements and the inability to meet com-
prehensive plan requirements include:
Arizona: City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 439 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1968) (initiatives not
applicable to zoning).
Hawaii: Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 777 P.2d 244 (Haw.
1989) (holding that zoning by initiative and referendum cannot meet comprehensive
plan requirements).
Idaho: Gumprecht v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 661 P.2d 1214 (Idaho 1983) (holding that
zoning may not be effectuated by direct legislation because power explicitly gave
zoning authority to city council).
Missouri: State ex rel Powers v. Donohue, 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1963) (initiatives not
applicable to zoning).
Nevada: Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 516 P.2d 1234 (Nev. 1973)
(holding that initiatives cannot be applied to zoning).
New Jersey: Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 312 A.2d 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Dlv.
1973); Smith v. Township of Livingston, 256 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.),
qff'd, 257 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1969).
New Mexico: Westgate Families v. County Clerk of Los Alamos, 667 P.2d 453 (N.M.
1983) (holding that grant of zoning authority is not applicable to direct legislation).
New York: Green v. Town Bd. of Warrensburg, 456 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(holding that direct legislative zoning cannot be exercised without express statutory
authority), appeal denied, 445 N.E.2d 654 (N.Y. 1983).
Pennsylvania: Horsham Township Council v. Mintz, 395 A.2d 677 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1987).
Texas: San Pedro N., Ltd. v. San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.) (direct legis-
lation not applicable to zoning because adds requirements'to zoning act), cwrt de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
Utah: Bird v. Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964) (ordinance stipulating zoning commis-
sions recommendation not subject to referendum).
Washington: Leonard v. City of Bothell, 557 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1976) (zoning cannot be
effectuated by direct legislation because people cannot enact zoning ordinance in ac-
cord with a comprehensive plan).
313. 557 P.2d 473, 480 (Cal. 1976).
ies.314 Since legislative bodies were statutorily required to accord no-
tice and hearing to affected landowners, the inability to fulfill these
requirements made direct legislation inapplicable to zoning.3 15 In
Gumprecht v. City of Coeur DAlene,3 16 for example, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that since the State's enabling statute required
zoning ordinances to be approved by the "governing board,"3 17 and
rezonings to "be submitted to the zoning or planning and zoning com-
mission, which shall evaluate the request,"3 18 the legislature in-
tended all zoning ordinances to be passed by city or county
councils.31 9 Similarly, in Westgate Families v. County Clerk of Los
Alamos,320 the New Mexico Supreme Court found that because the
state enabling act explicitly provided that zoning ordinances were to
be passed by legislative bodies,321 the grant of power was limited to
representative bodies and did not apply to zoning by referendum.3 22
In sum, states have split over whether direct electoral legislation
fulfills the procedural requirements of state zoning enabling acts.
Certain states have ruled that state zoning enabling act requirements
apply to plebiscites; that plebiscites are unable to fulfill the notice
and hearing requirements; and, therefore, that the direct legislative
process may not be properly applied to zoning. Other states, how-
ever, have ruled that state enabling statute procedural requirements
do not apply to plebiscites, but only to city councils. These states
have thus allowed the marriage of plebiscites and zoning to continue.
States that apply notice and hearing procedural requirements man-
dated by enabling legislation to city councils but not to zoning plebi-
314. 277 P. 308, 311 (Cal. 1929), overruled by Associated Home Builders v. City of
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
315. Id. It is more difficult for zoning initiatives to meet procedural due process re-
quirements (where required) than referenda, because in initiatives, the legislative en-
actment by the people fully bypasses the local legislature. In referenda, however, a
legislative enactment has already been effectuated by the city council and, presumably,
has been accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard. RATHKOPF, supra note 20, at
§ 29C.02[b]. Professor Freilich points out that since Hurst was expressly overruled by
Associated Home Builders, the reliance upon Hurst by those states which have found
direct legislation inapplicable to zoning has become "suspect." Freilich, supra note 8,
at 540. However, the courts that adopted Hurst were convinced by its rationale and
would likely be convinced of this rationale today, notwithstanding the fact that the de-
cision has been overruled in California, unless the courts diametrically changed their
initiative and referendum policies, as California did in Associated Home Builders.
316. 661 P.2d 1214 (Idaho 1983).
317. IDAHO CODE § 67-6511 (1983).
318. IDAHO CODE § 67-6509 (1983).
319. Gumprecht, 661 P.2d at 1217. Compare IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6511, 67-6509 with
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65850, 65853-65857 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (similar provisions
concerning notice and hearing).
320. 667 P.2d 453 (N.M. 1983).
321. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-14(c) (Michie 1983). The statute read: "A proposed or-
dinance shall be passed only by majority vote of all the members of the board of com-
missioners, and an existing ordinance shall be replaced by the same vote." Id.
322. Westgate, 667 P.2d at 455.
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scites appear to use a double standard. The grant of zoning power
comes from an enabling statute. The zoning power of city councils
and the electorate originate from the same enabling statute. Why,
then, should landowners have a different set of due process rights
when their land is zoned by a city council than when the zoning is
effectuated by community voters? Apparently, states that bypass
procedural due process requirements for zoning plebiscites do so out
of fear that zoning plebiscites will lack the ability to comply with
hearing and notice provisions of enabling legislation. Indeed, there
would be no reason to intentionally bypass expressly required notice
and hearing provisions if zoning plebiscites could meet the proce-
dural requirements.
In review, initiatives and referenda may apply only to legislative
acts, and, if subject to a zoning enabling act, must fulfill its proce-
dural requirements. The third hurdle which direct legislative zoning
acts must jump is the comprehensive plan requirement.
4. Accord With A Comprehensive Plan
A paramount requirement in the zoning process is that zoning ordi-
nances be enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan.3 23 The
SZEA, on which most present-day enabling acts are based, expressly
required that municipal zoning "regulations shall be made in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan."324 Initiatives and referenda, how-
ever, enact legislation based on the raw will of the people.= A
logical question follows: Is the raw will of the people, unrefined by
planning commission expertise or city council debate, capable of en-
acting zoning ordinances in accordance with so complicated a docu-
ment as the comprehensive plan?
Land use planning must be distinguished from zoning. A compre-
hensive plan is a formulation of land use planning policies,3 26 goals,
and maps, which provide use and density guidelines27 Zoning, as
one court concisely explained, "is the means by which the compre-
323. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65000 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
324. SZEA, supra note 70, at § 3. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65000 et seq. (West 1983 &
Supp. 1991). Forty-one states have adopted the SZEA. WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at
§ 18.05 (Supp. 1988).
325. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
326. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (Or. 1973) ("the basic
instrument for county or municipal land use planning is the 'comprehensive plan.' ").
See generally Haar, supra note 92.
327. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 36. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(a)-(b)(ii) (West
1983 & Supp. 1991).
hensive plan is effectuated."328 Since zoning implements the plan, it
is logical that zoning ordinances must be passed "in accordance" with
the comprehensive plan.29 The phrase "in accordance," however, is
unclear. It assumes a logical connection between the plan and zoning
ordinance, but does not define the level of reliance that a zoning ordi-
nance must place upon the plan. This lack of clarity is especially con-
fusing when comprehensive plan considerations enter the arena of
direct legislation. Indeed, if a plan must be rigidly adhered to, it is
questionable whether the general electorate is capable of enacting or-
dinances in full accordance with the comprehensive plan. This is not
a belittlement of the people's spirit, but rather a pragmatic concern
that the general electorate, acting alone, may lack the knowledge and
information required to understand and implement an intricately de-
tailed organizational document.33 o Comprehensive plans reflect the
work of many experts,3 3 ' and are consequently very complex. It is
doubtful that the electorate would, on its own, understand the com-
plexities of a plan to the extent necessary to enact a series of ordi-
nances which are uniformly in accordance with it.332 Because
enabling statutes require zoning ordinances to be in accordance with
a comprehensive plan, zoning ordinances which are not in accordance
with a comprehensive plan are void.333 Therefore, the level of reli-
ance that must be placed upon a comprehensive plan is controlling.
If a zoning ordinance must exercise a high-level of reliance on the
comprehensive plan, it will be more difficult for the electorate to en-
act an ordinance which is in accordance with the plan because the or-
dinance must adhere to the details of the plan. Consequently, if the
passage of zoning ordinances need only grant cursory importance to
the plan, it will be easier for zoning plebiscites to meet the compre-
328. Baker v. Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772, 775 (Or. 1975).
329. Id.
330. See THE FEDERALIST No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 10, 39 (James
Madison).
331. See Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968). The court in Udell gave great
weight to the comprehensive plan as a guiding document. Id. The court lauded land
use planning and betrayed the complex considerations which are infused into plans.
The court noted that zoning is of little value without planning. Id. The court stated
that "zoning can be a vital tool for maintaining a civilized form of existence only if we
employ the insights and the learning of the philosopher, the city planner, the econo-
mist, the sociologist, the public health expert and all the other professions concerned
with urban problems." Id, at 900. Professor Norman Williams, Jr. has characterized
the individuals who lend their talents to city planning as "the public servant," "the bu-
reaucrat," "the research specialist," "the computer whiz-kid," "the bureaucratic in-
fighter," "the money-maker," and "the urban expert." WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at
§§ 1.38-.44.
332. See Sparta v. Spillane, 312 A.2d 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
333. See Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317 (Cal.
1990) (zoning ordinance that conflicts with a general plan is void ab initio); Baker v.
City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975) (zoning ordinance which conflicts with com-
prehensive plan is void).
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hensive plan requirements because only general plan policies need be
considered.
States have adopted three different levels of reliance upon compre-
hensive plans. A minority of states have ruled that comprehensive
plans are binding.334 A majority of jurisdictions have determined, in
accordance with modern trends, that a comprehensive plan is merely
an advisory document. 3 5 Other states have fashioned a "middle ap-
proach" whereby great importance is attached to a plan, but the plan
serves neither as a binding nor advisory document.33 6
a.* The "Binding" Approach
A minority of states have read the comprehensive plan require-
ments strictly.3 37 These states have held that a comprehensive plan
must be accorded "binding" status.338 Consequently, any zoning ordi-
nance which differs from the plan is invalid. The binding approach is
well exemplified by the holding of the Oregon 3w Supreme Court in
Baker v. City of Milwaukie.3 40 In Baker, the plaintiff owned land
which was restricted by zoning ordinance to a density of thirty-nine
units per acre and two parking spaces per person. After the land had
been zoned,34l the city adopted a comprehensive plan which re-
stricted plaintiff's land, as well as surrounding land, to seventeen
units per acre. 42 Thereafter, the planning commission granted a va-
riance for the construction of a twenty-six unit per acre apartment
complex next to plaintiff's land.3 "3 In addition to the increase in al-
lowable units, the variance also decreased the parking space require-
ment from two to one and one-half parking spaces per unit.3 " The
334. See infra notes 337-355 and accompanying text.
335. Freilich, supra note 8, at 546-47. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 36.
336. See injfra notes 372-382 and accompanying text.
337. Freilich, supra note 8 at 547-49.
338. See Baker v. Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 722 (Or. 1975).
339. The state of Oregon keeps the zoning process under tight control. See supra
notes 257-280 and infra notes 340-355 and accompanying text.
340. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975).
341. Usually a plan is adopted before zoning ordinances are enacted. See generally
Haar, supra note 92, at 1154. It is testimony to the court's strict holding that the court
held the plan binding on ordinances enacted both before and after the comprehensive
plan.
342. Baker, 533 P.2d at 773.
343. Id at 774. The development was Initially planned as a 95 unit complex. Id
After the variance had been granted, the builders applied for a 102 unit building per-
mit. 102 units on the property would cause an average of 26 units per acre to be built.
Id
344. Id.
plaintiff brought suit to cancel the variance and to enjoin building
permits. The Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the variance on the
ground that it was not granted in accordance with the city's compre-
hensive plan.345
The court granted binding status to the comprehensive plan, and
further ruled that all zoning ordinances must be in accordance with
the comprehensive plan, both those which were enacted before and
after the comprehensive plan.346 The court compared the compre-
hensive plan to a binding, but flexible, constitution, and noted that
the purpose of a comprehensive zoning plan is to "bind future legisla-
tures when they enact implementary materials."3 4 7 The court rea-
soned that since the enabling act mandated that municipal zoning be
made "in accord with a well considered plan,"3' 8 comprehensive
plans must be accorded controlling, rather than advisory, status,349 to
the point where a city must "conform prior conflicting zoning ordi-
nances to it."0 The court concluded that due to the controlling na-
ture of a comprehensive plan, ordinances "which [allow] . . .more
intensive use than that prescribed by the plan must fail."351
If a plan is accorded binding status, as in Baker, it is difficult to vis-
ualize how an initiative or referendum could fulfill every detail of
the plan.352 The purpose of the plan is to avoid piecemeal zoning and
to foster a uniform and balanced land use structure throughout the
community.a 3 If zoning is effectuated by initiative or referendum, it
appears that some aspect of a binding plan will be inherently disre-
garded because of the electorate's lack of information and knowledge
of the complex plan.354 Nonetheless, certain states that grant bind-
ing status to their plans allow zoning by plebiscite to continue. 5 Ini-
tiative ordinances are more likely to conform to a plan in states that
345. Id. at 779.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 775 (quoting Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Con-
stitution, 20 LAW & CoNTEmp. PRoBs. 353, 375 (1955)).
348. 1919 Or. Laws 300; OR& REV. STAT. § 227.240(1) (repealed by ch. 767, § 10 (1975),
replaced by § 227.215).
349. Baker, 533 P.2d at 777.
350. Id. at 779.
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. Freilich, supra note 8, at 550. Professors Freilich and Gruemmer write: "The
rejection of direct legislation because of its failure to satisfy the comprehensive plan
requirement is logical in jurisdictions which afford the plan binding status as a land-
use planning instrument." Id.
353. Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1957).
354. See Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317 (Cal.
1990) (zoning initiative void ab initio because did not comport with comprehensive
plan); Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 777 P.2d 244 (Haw.
1989) (initiative and referendum incompatible with zoning because unable to produce
uniform zoning in accordance with comprehensive plan).
355. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976);
Allison v. Washington County, 548 P.2d 188 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
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grant only advisory legal status to comprehensive plans, because the
resulting ordinances can remain in line with the general policies of
the plan while conflicting with its detailed specifics.
b. The "Advisory" Approach
Certain jurisdictions have accorded advisory, rather than binding,
status to their comprehensive plans.3w Kozesnik v. Township of
Montgomery provides a good example of this position.357 In Kozes-
nik, the town of Montgomery rezoned a mountain area from agricul-
tural and residential use to light industrial use, pursuant to a request
by the 3M corporation, which wanted to undertake mining operations
on the mountain.358 The landowner plaintiffs challenged the rezon-
ing on the ground that it was not in accordance with the comprehen-
sive plan, which designated the mountain for agricultural and
residential use. The court upheld the rezoning based on the argu-
ment that a plan is advisory in nature, but ultimately invalidated the
rezoning on other grounds.359
The court reasoned that because the zoning enabling statute did
not provide that a master plan must precede zoning ordinances, the
plan was not a "prerequisite to zoning action."' 0 The court noted,
however, that it was favorable for a plan to be enacted before zoning
ordinances are passed.361 The court further reasoned that since a
plan is not a prerequisite to zoning, it may be set forth in the end
product of a zoning ordinance itself, rather than as a separate exter-
356. These states include: California (but see Lesher Communications, Inc; v. City
of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1990) (holding that zoning initiative was void ab
initio because did not comport with comprehensive plan seems to indicate California
plans are binding)), Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Freilich,
supra note 8, at 547 n.241.
357. 131 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957).
358. Id. 4-5. In reality, since the mountain was located between Montgomery and
Hillsborough Townships, both townships were involved. Id.
359. Id. See infra note 365.
360. Kozesnik, 131 A.2d at 7. There was no external plan in Kozesnik. Instead, the
court construed that the plan was embodied in the original- ordinance itself, which
zoned the mountain for agricultural and residential use. As opposed to the holding in
Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975), which mandated that either a plan
must be enacted before zoning ordinances, or pre-plan ordinances must be changed to
conform to the plan, id at 779, the court in Kozesnik allowed zoning ordinances to in-
corporate planning policies, all of which, when aggregated, would constitute a plan.
Kozesnik, 131 A.2d at 8.
361. Kozesnik, 131 A.2d at 7.
nal document.38 2 The court went on to describe comprehensive plans
as advisory documents. It stated that the word "'plan' connotes an
integrated product of a rational process and [the word] 'comprehen-
sive' requires something beyond a piecemeal approach, both to be re-
vealed by the ordinance considered in relation to the physical facts
and the purposes authorized by [statute]."' 3 In response to the
plaintiff's allegation that the rezoning was not in accord with the
plan, the court responded that a zoning ordinance may be invalidated
only "if the presumption in favor of the ordinance is overcome by a
clear showing that it is arbitrary or unreasonable."' 4 Because a zon-
ing ordinance may be invalidated only if it is arbitrary or unreasona-
ble, regardless of whether it conflicts with the plan, the plan is
merely advisory in nature. Although the court ultimately struck
down the rezoning on other grounds,365 it held that a rezoning does
not fail merely because it conflicts with the comprehensive plan.36
Kozesnik made review of zoning decisions more difficult because it
rejected the requirement of a separate and external plan, holding in-
stead that a plan may be embodied into a zoning ordinance. Without
a separate comprehensive plan, courts that follow Kozesnik must
look to how legislatures have decided zoning changes in the past in
order to determine whether the legislative actions at bar are proper.
Professors Freilich and Gruemmer point out that Kozesnik "opens
the door to whimsical zoning, since reviewing courts are forced to
look at the past actions of a legislative body to ascertain a generalized
land-use policy."367
Certain advisory jurisdictions have nevertheless invalidated the
practice of direct electoral legislative zoning because of incompatibili-
ties with comprehensive plan requirements.6 In Sparta v. Spil-
lane,36 9 for example, the Superior Court of New Jersey reasoned that
because rezonings by plebiscite would "fragment zoning without any
overriding concept," the reason for having the comprehensive plan
requirement would be vitiated.370 The court believed that zoning ref-
erenda would create a disparate group of ordinances which were not
enacted in fulfillment of comprehensive plan goals.371
362. Id. at 8. The court in Baker mandated the existence of a separate plan. Baker,
533 P.2d at 779.
363. Kozesnik, 131 A.2d at 7.
364. 1d at 8 (citing Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 88 A.2d 607 (N.J. 1952)).
365. The court ruled against the rezoning because it did not afford sufficient protec-
tion to surrounding residential use. Id at 17-19.
366. Id. at 8.
367. Freilich, supra note 8, at 548.
368. See infra notes 369-371 and accompanying text.
369. 312 A.2d 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
370. Id at 157.
371. Id
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Notwithstanding cases such as Sparta, it is easier for plebiscite zon-
ing to achieve comprehensive plan requirements when the plan is
granted advisory status because direct legislative ordinances need
meet only the overriding policy of the plan, not every plan detail.
c. The "Middle" Approach
Whereas one group of states has adopted a strict approach with re-
gards to comprehensive plan requirements, another group has
granted simple advisory status to plans. New York has ruled that a
comprehensive plan is neither binding nor advisory,372 and has in-
stead attached great importance to the comprehensive plan, without
forcing ordinances to conform to each and every plan requirement.
In Udell v. Haas, the court granted "middle level" status to a com-
prehensive plan.373 In Udell, the New York Court of Appeals viewed
the comprehensive plan requirement in a different light when it
struck down the rezoning of a parcel from business to residential
use.37 4 The plaintiff had operated a restaurant on his land for twenty
years.3 75 After cursory consideration,376 the city council rezoned
plaintiff's land from business to residential use. Rather than view
the comprehensive plan as an overriding document of detailed policy
and geographical mapping, the court reasoned that "[t]he thought be-
hind the [plan] requirement is that consideration must be given to
the needs of the community as a whole." 377 The court noted that a
plan ensures that zoning will not be made by "the whims of an artic-
ulate minority or. .. majority."37 8 Because the plan embodies the
community's needs, the court reasoned, zoning ordinances which are
passed in consideration of the plan will be neither arbitrary nor ca-
pricious.379 However, the court did not fully disregard the impor-
tance of the plan as an expression of policy goals and district maps.3 80
In fact, it noted that the plan was "the essence of zoning," "not a
mere technicality," and that "local zoning authorities [should] pay
372. Freilich, supra note 8, at 550.
373. 235 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968). See Freilich, supra note 8, at 550.
374. Udell, 235 N.E.2d at 904-05.
375. Id. at 899.
376. The planning board recommended the rezoning from business to residential
use to the city council after simply viewing the preliminary sketch of a new develop-
ment. Id. at 902-03.
377. Id. at 900.
378. Id. (citing De Sena v. Gulde, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)).
379. Udell, 235 N.E.2d at 901.
380. Id. at 900-01.
more than mock obeisance to the statutory mandate that zoning be
'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' "381 The court invalidated
the rezoning of plaintiff's land because the city council decision had
not taken into consideration the needs of the community, and there-
fore had failed to rezone in accordance with the comprehensive
plan.3 82
In sum, states have adopted three different approaches to compre-
hensive plans. One group of states has granted binding status to the
plan. These states have rendered it more difficult for initiatives to
meet enabling statute requirements which mandate that zoning ordi-
nances be passed in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Nonethe-
less, certain states that accord binding status to their plans have
failed to rule that plebiscites are inherently incapable of fulfilling
plan requirements. Another group of states has accorded plans mere
advisory status and have thus made it easier for plebiscites to apply
to zoning. In these states, zoning ordinances which are in conflict
with the plan will fail only if they are arbitrary or unreasonable. Fi-
nally, a third group of states has accorded the plan middle level sta-
tus. These states have interpreted the plan not as a controlling
aggregation of policies and map details, but rather as an assurance
that zoning will not be carried out to the detriment of the commu-
nity's needs. The middle approach nonetheless mandates reliance
upon the plan, albeit in a non-binding fashion, so as to ensure that
zoning will not be undertaken as an ad hoc or piecemeal process. In
these jurisdictions, zoning plebiscites should be capable of passing
comprehensive plan scrutiny, especially since the jurisdictions place
heavy reliance upon the needs of the community as a whole. Conse-
quently, since the community expresses itself as a whole in plebi-
scites,383 comprehensive plan requirements should not be difficult to
fulfill in a middle jurisdiction.
Although some have suggested that the advisory approach is the
modern trend,38 4 it seems that states are becoming increasingly con-
cerned about the inherent inability of initiatives to meet comprehen-
sive plan objectives. Two recent cases have made this point clear. 385
381. I The court stated that without the comprehensive plan, "there can be no
rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being
served and that zoning does not become nothing more than a Gallup poll." I& at 901.
382. I& at 905.
383. One assumption posits that the community expresses itself as a whole when
enacting zoning ordinances by direct legislation. This is erroneous because zoning ini-
tiatives and referenda instead foster the emergence of special interest groups or "elitist
factions." See inffra notes 434-445 and accompanying text.
384. LAND-USE, supra note 2, at 36; Freilich, supra note 8, at 550.
385. Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1990);
Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 777 P.2d 244 (Haw. 1989).
See also Marblehead v. City of San Clemente, 277 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1991) (zoning initia-
tive which directs city council to act on land use matter is invalid).
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In Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, which had previously been notorious for its
staunch support of zoning plebiscites, 386 invalidated a rezoning initia-
tive on the ground that it was inconsistent with the comprehensive
plan.387 In Lesher, a growth oriented comprehensive plan3S88 was in
effect when an initiative imposed a building moratorium on the en-
tire city until traffic congestion decreased by fifteen percent. The
comprehensive plan had anticipated an increase in traffic pursuant to
pro-development policies but had not curtailed development because
of it.389 The landowner plaintiffs filed suit to have the rezoning set
aside on the ground that it was inconsistent with the comprehensive
plan. The California Supreme Court ruled that the rezoning initia-
tive was void ab initio since it was inconsistent with the city's com-
prehensive plan.390 The court stated:
A zoning ordinance that conflicts with a general plan is invalid at the time it
is passed. The court does not invalidate the [rezoning] ordinance. It does no
more than determine the existence of the conflict. It is the preemptive effect
of the [state zoning enabling act] ... which invalidates the ordinance.3 9 1
After the rezoning initiative was enacted, the city attempted to
amend the general plan so that it would be consistent with the rezon-
ing initiative. The California Supreme Court decided that the at-
tempted amendment did not work as an amendment.392 In its ruling
on this issue, the court interjected an important comment which
seems to run against its past pro-zoning initiative39 3 decisions. The
court stated, "[Aissuming, but not deciding, that voters may amend a
general plan by initiative, [the amendatory measure] cannot be
deemed a general plan amendment."3 94 The court's statement seems
to indicate that, contrary to previous California decisions which al-
lowed plebiscites in all zoning matters except variances and special
use permits,3 93 the court has executed an "about-face" on the applica-
386. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980) (all zoning
actions are legislative for direct legislative purposes); Associated Home Builders v. City
of Costa Mesa, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (enabling act procedural due process require-
ments not applicable to zoning initiatives and referenda).
387. Lesher, 802 P.2d at 322.
388. The plan in Lesher allowed as much development as could reasonably be ac-
comodated by the city. Id. at 319.
389. Id..
390. Id. at 322.
391. Id. at 324-25.
392. Id. at 321-22.
393. See cases cited supra note 386.
394. Leasher, 802 P.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
395. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 572 n.11 (Cal. 1980).
bility of initiatives to rezonings.
Similar to the California decision in Lesher, the Hawaii Supreme
Court ruled that initiatives are inapplicable to zoning matters be-
cause initiatives inherently conflict with comprehensive plan require-
ments.3 m In Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Co. v. City and County
of Honolulu, plaintiff landowners intended to develop a tract of land
for use as apartments. 9 The city approved their application for a
special use permit.3 98 Residents who were opposed to the impending
development successfully obtained an initiative on the ballot which,
if passed, would rezone the plaintiffs' land from residential to preser-
vation status.399 The plaintiffs sued to have the application of initia-
tives to zoning declared invalid. The Hawaii Supreme Court agreed
with the plaintiffs and ruled that the initiative and referendum pro-
cess was inapplicable to zoning matters.4o0
The court first noted that the enabling act mandated that zoning
ordinances be passed in accordance with a general plan.40 The court
then reasoned that zoning by direct legislation would serve to create
piecemeal zoning rather than ordinances which are in accordance
with the comprehensive plan, stating that "uniformity required in
the proper administration of a zoning ordinance could be wholly de-
stroyed by referendum. A single decision by the electors by referen-
dum could well destroy the very purpose of zoning where such
decision was in conflict with the general [plan]." 40 2 Based on this
reasoning, the court invalidated the practice of zoning by initiative
and referendum.40 3
States that allow direct legislative zoning appear to bypass the is-
sue of spot-zoning by the electorate. Whether a plan is binding or
merely advisory in nature, it seems that the practice of direct legisla-
tive zoning eventually leads to zoning in discord with the comprehen-
sive plan, or "piecemeal" zoning, as courts in both binding and
advisory jurisdictions have noted.40 4 If initiative and referendum
zoning ultimately leads to zoning which is not fully in accordance
with a comprehensive plan, and if parcels of land are thereby zoned
in a non-uniform, ad hoc fashion, then to allow direct legislative zon-
396. Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 777 P.2d 244, 250
(Haw. 1989).
397. Id. at 244.
398. Id. at 246.
399. Id
400. ld. at 250.
401. Id, at 246. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-4(a) (Supp. 1988).
402. Kaiser, 777 P.2d at 247.
403. Id. at 250.
404. See Baker v. Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975) (plan is binding); Kozesnik v.
Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957) (plan is advisory). Yet both have de-
scribed zoning without comprehensive plan considerations as undesirable "piecemeal"
zoning.
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ing to continue would constitute approval of "direct electoral spot-
zoning" by the courts. Courts that have characterized plans as advi-
sory in nature have made it easy for direct legislative zoning to avoid
electoral spot-zoning problems because only tenuous reliance upon
the plan is required in their jurisdictions. However, in jurisdictions
that have ruled both that plans are binding and that direct legislative
zoning is appropriate, electoral spot-zoning is perhaps the reason why
jurisdictions have either increased their characterizations of plans as
advisory, or have struck down incompatible ordinances or the direct
legislative zoning process itself, as did the courts in Lesher and
Kaiser.
In sum, it seems that although many jurisdictions have allowed the
marriage of direct electoral legislation to the zoning process, a new
trend exists whereby states are shifting from their previous pro-initi-
ative stance to a more pragmatic anti-initiative stance based upon
considerations that comprehensive plans, whether advisory or bind-
ing, impose real procedural inconsistencies with enabling act
requirements.
Once a zoning plebiscite has fulfilled the legislative characteriza-
tion, state zoning enabling act, and comprehensive plan require-
ments, there are no longer any impediments to its practice in
communities. One additional area of law, however, must be discussed
within the context of initiative and referendum zoning-judicial
review.
5. Judicial Review of Zoning Initiatives and Referenda
Judicial review of zoning ordinances is of paramount importance
because it speaks directly to the amount of control exercised by
states over zoning decisions. The level of judicial review accorded to
legislative decisions is highly permissive.405 In determining whether
a legislative enactment is valid, courts generally apply the rational
basis test, which upholds the validity of legislative acts if they ration-
405. Oregon has effectively bypassed the permissive judicial review problem. Ore-
gon characterizes rezonings as legislative acts for the purpose of initiative and referen-
dum, but considers rezonings judicial for purposes of judicial review. In doing so,
Oregon is able to allow a high level of voter participation in zoning, while retaining
great control in the process so as to ensure that zoning ordinances enacted by direct
legislation are valid and meet all statutory requirements. See Fasano v. Board of
County Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) (site-specific rezonings are judicial and
require higher level of judicial review than legislative acts). But see Allison v. Wash-
ington County, 548 P.2d 188 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (rezonings are legislative for purposes
of direct legislation).
ally relate to legitimate state ends.406 Consequently, the level of re-
view for determining the validity of legislatively enacted zoning
ordinances is similarly permissive. In Euclid, the Supreme Court
ruled that zoning ordinances are valid unless they are "clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."40 7 The level of review ac-
corded to zoning ordinances enacted by initiative or referendum is
identical to that accorded to city council zoning decisions.40 8 This is
not to say that landowners cannot challenge the validity of zoning or-
dinances enacted by initiative or referendum.4 9 Indeed, the passage
of an initiative or referendum ordinance cannot validate an unconsti-
tutional zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court explicitly noted this
in Eastlake. The Court stated:
If the substantive result of the referendum is arbitrary and capricious, bearing
no relation to the police power, then the fact that the voters . .. wish it so
would not save the restriction... "[t]he sovereignty of the people is itself sub-
ject to those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and re-
main unrepealed.''4 1 0
The permissive level of judicial review accorded to zoning ordi-
nances enacted by plebiscite involves problems based upon pragmatic
considerations. Electors who vote in zoning initiatives or referenda
are sometimes primarily motivated by property values and personal
distastes for proposed uses411 rather than by the long-term good of
the community.4' 2 For example, an alcohol and drug rehabilitation
406. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (regulation which has
rational relation to legitimate state objective is beyond constitutional scrutiny). See
generally TRIBE, supro note 284, at 582-85, 1440, 1451 (rational basis test should ex-
amine means and ends of legislation). See also Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Law-
making, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1975) (debate enough to explain legislative motive).
407. City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
408. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976).
409. Landowners may attack the constitutionality of zoning ordinances passed by
direct legislation on the same grounds that could be used in non-plebiscite zoning.
RATHKOPF, supra note 20, at § 29C.04[2]. See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 668 (attacking refer-
endum on due process grounds); McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th
Cir. 1986) (attacking on equal protection grounds), cert denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987);
Lum Yip Kee Ltd. v. City & County of Honolulu, 767 P.2d 815 (Haw. 1989) (attacking
initiative on spot zoning grounds); County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co.,
653 P.2d 766 (Haw. 1982) (attacking referendum on vested rights grounds); Poirier v.
Grand Blanc Township, 423 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (attacking referendum
on takings grounds).
410. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 676 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)).
411. See WILLIAMs, supra note 71, at §§ 15.01-15.07. Property owners fear that a
new use will devalue their property. This is especially true when the new use is con-
troversial or personally distasteful, such as a landfill, a nuclear power plant, a drug
rehabilitation center, or an adult bookstore.
412. This applies except when enacting comprehensive plans, which are policy
statements of how a community should ultimately function, both aesthetically and
practically. It is entirely acceptable for voters to act arbitrarily and/or capriciously in
determining how their city should look and function. However, it is much more harm-
ful to individual landowners for voters to make specific zoning decisions, which may
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clinic may be proposed by a developer in a city which has a high pop-
ulation of addicts. Such a use would be highly beneficial to the com-
munity. Electors, however, may strike down the proposed use by
initiative or referendum out of fear that surrounding property values
will decline because undesirable elements will invade the area. If the
landowner challenges the resulting ordinance, the ordinance will be
upheld unless it is "arbitrary or capricious, bearing no relation to the
police power."413 It seems unlikely that a court would perceive the
ordinance as arbitrary or capricious, because it was enacted by the
people themselves. In a representative democracy, it would be sys-
temically difficult for a court to rule that the will of the people is ar-
bitrary or capricious, even if the resulting ordinance were arbitrary
or capricious. Indeed, the Supreme Court has refused to accept the
argument that the will of the people is more arbitrary than the prod-
uct of the legislature.414 An admission that the will of the people is,
at times, arbitrary or capricious works against the American theory
of democratic government and would entirely vitiate the applicability
of direct legislation, especially to zoning. The issue therefore leads to
an impasse: Either the level of judicial review accorded to direct
electoral zoning enactments must become less permissive so as to al-
low heightened review of possibly incorrect plebiscite ordinances, or
the practice of initiative and referendum zoning itself must be aban-
doned because it is an untenable proposition that courts will allow ar-
bitrary or capricious initiative ordinances to remain in force. A
heightened level of judicial review would allow a smooth cooperation
between direct legislative zoning and judicial review of its resulting
ordinances.415
The concept that the raw will of the people may sometimes be arbi-
trary or capricious is a leading argument against initiatives and refer-
enda generally, and especially within the zoning context. The nature
of the will of the people is at the heart of a controversy which pits
direct democratic concerns against the republican theory of represen-
tative government.
not be in accord with the comprehensive plan once a comprehensive plan has been
adopted.
413. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 676.
414. Speaking through Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the majority opinion in
Eastlake, the Court stated that the will of the people is no more arbitrary than that of
the elected members of a legislature. Id. at 675 n.10. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
'There is no more advance assurance that a legislative body will act by conscientiously
applying consistent standards than there is with respect to voters." Id
415. See Freilich, supra note 8, at 536-37 (indicating support of Fasano doctrine).
IV. A SYSTEMIC SPur: DmECr DEMOCRACY V. REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY
Arguments in favor of initiatives and referenda are based on direct
democratic principles. Arguments against the direct legislative pro-
cess are based on the republican theory of representative govern-
ment. Both direct democracy and the republican form of government
are variations upon the democratic theme. The goal of direct democ-
racy is to cleanse the government of its potentially corrupt legislative
decision making powers by a direct translation of popular will into
law.416 The goal of the republican form of government is to refine
the raw will of the people through the debate of popularly elected
representative officials so that the end product of law is both sensible
and in accord with the will of the people.
The initiative and referendum process was an outgrowth of the
Progressive movement in the early twentieth century.417 Progres-
sives, dissatisfied with their elected legislative representatives, as-
serted that the ills of democracy could be cured only by an added
infusion of popular democratic power into the system.418 Progres-
sives wished to ensure that potential disregard of the popular will by
legislative officials would be either tamed or bypassed by the people's
power of initiative and referendum, by which the people could exer-
cise their reserved legislative authority to achieve efficient govern-
ance.419 The Progressive's love of initiatives and referenda, however,
is necessarily based on the assumption that: (1) the will of the people
is without flaw, and (2) votes in initiatives and referenda are pure
translations of the popular will into law. Without these two assump-
tions it would, at best, be difficult to achieve the desired government
cleansing and efficiency of the Progressive movement.420 Indeed, if
the will of the people were either "arbitrary or capricious," or inef-
fectively translated at initiative and referendum voting booths, the
Progressive ideal of direct democracy would be as undesirable as the
government it was attempting to cleanse. The two necessary pre-
416. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
417. See i&; ROHAN, supra note 13, at § 50.03[7] n.103.
418. The fighting words of the Progressive movement were "[t]he cure for the ills
of democracy is more democracy!" REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRAC-
TICE AND THEORY 29 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978).
419. See RIcHARD HOFsTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 225 (1955). Professor Hof-
stadter wrote that the Progressive movement focused on direct legislative democracy
because it hoped that the direct legislative process would
deprive machine government of the advantages it had in checkmating popular
control, and make government accessible to the superior disinterestedness of
the average citizen. Then, with the power of the bosses broken or crippled, it
would be possible to check the incursions of the interests upon the welfare of
the people and realize a cleaner, more efficient government.
420. 1&
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sumptions of direct democracy, however, are erroneous. The will of
the people is not flawless. Even if it were flawless, the will of the
people is not perfectly translated into laws enacted by initiative and
referendum.
It is erroneous to believe, as did the Progressives, that the will of
the people is flawless. Within the context of initiative and referen-
dum zoning, it is natural that popular interests lean more heavily to-
ward stable property values and personally pleasing land uses than
toward the long-term good of the community.42 1 Sometimes all three
interests will be consonant. More often than not, however, they will
be resonantly discordant. In direct democratic processes, such as zon-
ing initiatives and referenda, the popular will is not filtered through
the representative institution of the legislative branch and may result
in laws contrary to the public good.422 It is ironic that the Supreme
Court has not agreed with this proposition, even though it is the
keeper of the Constitution, and consequently, of the representative
democratic system itself.423
The republican form of government presents a valid alternative to
the inefficient direct democratic process-representative democracy.
In the representative democratic process, the job of the legislature is
to consider all the interests of the people and refine them through
debate so that the end product of the law will be consonant with pop-
ular interests as well as with the long-term good of the commu-
nity.4 4 In The Federalist,425 Founding Father James Madison 42
421. One of the most important factors considered in city council zoning decisions is
municipal tax revenue. Progressive-style arguments in favor of direct democracy
sometimes assert that city councils are too much in favor of development and that they
form a political-business alliance with developers. What such arguments do not take
into consideration are the sometimes substantial increase in municipal revenues that
are generated by property development. Municipal tax revenues from property taxes
form an integral part of the long-term "public good" of the community. By obtaining
increased municipal funds through property development, such funds do not have to
be obtained by personal or excise tax increases. See WILLIAMS, supra note 71, at
§§ 14.01-14.10.
422. This is because the people, without sufficient information or specialization,
may not visualize the long term consequences of a zoning initiative as clearly as the
planning commission.
423. See supra note 331.
424. See infra note 427 andaccompanying text.
425. THE FEDERALIST is a, collection of papers written by Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay and James Madison in support of the newly drafted United States Constitu-
tion. THE FEDERALIST at xxii (Modern Library ed., 1937). The Federalist papers were
initially published in the New York press, beginning on October 27, 1787. 1& The Fed-
eralist papers followed the establishment of federal forms of government in France
(translated into French in 1792), Brazil (translated into Portuguese in 1840), Germany
argued for the representative democratic process, which he defined
as republican in nature. In November of 1787, Madison wrote these
learned words:
The two great points of difference between a [direct] democracy and a repub-
lic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small
number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citi-
zens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is... to refine and enlarge the public views,
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wis-
dom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public
voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more conso-
nant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, con-
vened for the purpose.427
Madison noted that it was possible for corrupt men to dupe voters
and accede to elected positions to harm the public good and that "en-
lightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."428 Such state-
ments are similar to the Progressive argument which asserts that
legislatures are replete with officials who are corrupting the public
good.429 Of course, as noted by the Supreme Court, the remedy
against corrupt or ineffective elected officials is ouster in the follow-
ing election.430 If one balances the harms inflicted on the community
by ineffective or corrupt legislative officials and those inflicted by di-
rect legislation, it seems easier to remedy an incompetent legislature
rather than to ensure that laws passed by direct legislation will be
based upon sound interests. The interests of the people are static.
Regardless of socio-economic mobility among paricular individuals,
popular interests will remain the same for different groups of people.
It seems that the representative system of government serves the
public good more effectively than direct democracy. This especially
(translated into German in 1864), and Argentina (translated into Spanish in 1868). Id.
Hamilton, Jay, and Madison originally published the papers under the pseudonym
"Publius." Id Individual authorship of the papers was not established until the papers
reached France in 1792. 1I Much controversy still remains concerning the individual
authorship of Nos. 49-58 and Nos. 62-63. 1d THE FEDERALIST is especially enlightening
in its analysis of popular will and its translation into law via a representative form of
government, Id.
426. James Madison (1751-1836) was a distinguished student of history, ethics and
government at Princeton University. Id. at xxiii. He entered politics at the very be-
ginning of the American Revolution and served as a member of the Virginia Conven-
tion, the Virginia Assembly, and the Continental Congress. I& His keen insight and
knowledge of government and history earned him the reputation of "master-builder of
the Constitution." Id. Madison's records of the Continental Congress are the most
thorough of all members of the Continental Congress. Id. As a member of the first
Congress, Madison also helped frame the Bill of Rights. I& at xxiv. Madison served in
the new House of Representatives, as Secretary of State, and eventually as President
of the United States. Id
427. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1937).
428. 1d. at 57.
429. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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rings true within the zoning context, where comprehensive plans are
so complex that direct legislation often leads to "piecemeal zon-
ing."43l Alexander Hamilton,43 2 co-author of The Federalist, wrote
that representatives of the people "will consist almost entirely of pro-
prietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned profes-
sions, who will truly represent all those different interests and
views."433 Members of city councils will thus be able to comprehend
the comprehensive plan and interpret it more correctly when enact-
ing zoning ordinances.434
Initiatives and referenda are, however, very positive instruments
when used to formulate general policy. The adoption of a compre-
hensive plan by initiative or referendum is favorable to the commu-
nity. The adoption of general zoning policy is indeed best effectuated
by direct legislation, because such an adoption may be validly based
on arbitrary or capricious dislikes of certain uses. Zoning ordinances
pursuant to the plan, however, are best effectuated by a representa-
tive body which is able to refine the raw will of the people in conso-
nance with the comprehensive plan.
The second necessary assumption of the pro-initiative and referen-
dum argument is that the will of the people, even if it is flawless, will
be effectively translated into votes on election day. This is also an er-
roneous assumption. Those who support initiatives and referenda in
zoning portray the people as a united force.43 5 This is far from true
in practice. When a zoning decision is made either by initiative or
referendum, it is not the people who take over the decision making
431. Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 777 P.2d 244, 247
(Haw. 1989); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1957).
432. Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804) was educated at Columbia University and en-
tered politics through the military as military secretary to Commander-in-Chief Gen-
eral George Washington. THE FEDERALIsr at xxiii (Modern Library ed., 1937).
Hamilton was Regimental Commander of the American troops at the battle of York-
town. Id. Although Hamilton irregularly attended the Constitutional Convention, he
later gave his full efforts to the ratification of the Constitution in the state of New
York and wrote half of the Federalist papers. Id As a Federalist, Hamilton favored a
centralized national government. Id. Hamilton was the first Secretary of the Treasury
and built the framework of American economic policy. Id.
433. THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed.,
1937).
434. This is not to say that city councils will interpret the plan correctly, either in-
tentionally or unintentionally, but that city councils possess the ability to interpret a
plan more correctly than the general electorate.
435. Interview with Dr. Leo M. Snowiss, Professor of American Legislative Politics,
University of California, Los Angeles, (Mar. 19, 1991) [hereinafter Snowiss interview].
Professor Snowiss has been intricately involved in the zoning process of Claremont,
California.
process, but factions of "elitist" advocates and special interest
groups.4 6 Advocates of plebiscite zoning have argued that these
groups have enslaved representatives and that direct legislative zon-
ing is the only remedy available to ensure that proper zoning ordi-
nances are passed.4 7 The problem with such an argument lies in the
remedies to the problems posed by special interest groups. Although
it is possible to oust elected representatives from office, and thereby
send a message to legislators that special interest group pandering
will no longer be tolerated, it is not possible to arrest the influence
that special interest groups exercise over misinformed and often un-
informed voters. In a zoning initiative or referendum, advocates and
special interest groups will coalesce on each side of the debate.43s
The people are led into one faction or another by the leaders of these
factions. Factions were described by Madison as great dangers to the
public good. Madison wrote:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a ma-
jority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. 4 3 9
Within the zoning context, these factions develop along economic,
ideological, and geographic lines.440 Madison argued that representa-
tive government would temper these factions, not by eliminating
their causes,441 but by eliminating their power to make law, and
therefore, their power of destruction.442 The author 44 3 of The Feder-
alist No. 51 stated:
[I]f men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
436. I& For a discussion of interest group influence and lawmaking, see generally
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
See also Pantzer, NIMBY: Opposing a Land Use Change, PROB. & PROP. 30 (Jan./Feb.
1991) (describing procedures and tactics for use by neighboring landowners against re-
zoning measure).
437. See Freilich, supra note 8, at 516-19.
438. Snowiss interview, supra note 435.
439. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1937).
440. Snowiss interview, supra note 435. Communities are often divided into neigh-
borhoods when faced with zoning initiatives and referenda. Il
441. Madison believed that the greatest cause of factions is the unequal distribution
of property. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55-56 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed.,
1937). This certainly rings true in the modern zoning context, where property values
and their stability are major forces in the shaping of public opinion in zoning.
442. Snowiss interview, supra note 435. Whereas direct legislation interposes dis-
tance between factions, representative government inherently allows a closeness be-
tween elected representatives and their constituents, who are divided, as factions are,
along neighborhood lines. The closeness between elected representatives and their
constituents provides an influx of information of "the public will." Snowiss interview,
supra note 435.
443. It is not certain whether the author of THE FEDERALIST No. 51 was Alexander
Hamilton or James Madison. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 335 (Alexander Hamilton or
James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1937).
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men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself.4 44
One could argue that the disagreements between factions are simi-
lar to the debate in a representative body which refines the popular
will of the people. Such an argument would be erroneous, however,
because tensions between factions are not always based upon concern
for the public good, but rather on the respective interests of the fac-
tions that are at odds.4 45
In sum, it appears that while initiatives and referenda serve a posi-
tive purpose in formulating comprehensive plans of zoning goals and
policies, they are less efficient or desirable than representative bodies
in enacting zoning ordinances pursuant to the plan for the public
good of the community. Election to office and ouster from office are
basic concepts of representative democracy and continue to serve as
viable remedies for ineffective and potentially corrupt representa-
tives in city councils.
V. CONCLUSION
There are three major problems facing the application of initiatives
and referenda to the zoning process: (1) the legislative act require-
ment, (2) the inability to fulfill procedural requirements of state zon-
ing enabling statutes, and (3) the seemingly inherent inconsistency of
direct legislative zoning with comprehensive zoning requirements.
Although the several states uniformly agree that the adoption of
comprehensive plans may be effectuated via initiative or referendum,
the states are greatly divided on whether direct legislation may be
properly applied to rezonings. While certain states have character-
ized the adoption of rezoning ordinances as legislative acts and have
thereby allowed the application of direct legislation to zoning, others
have prohibited the marriage of the two by ruling that rezonings are
administrative in nature. Some states have prohibited direct legisla-
tive zoning by either ruling that state zoning enabling statutes do not
apply to initiative and referendum lawmaking powers, or by ruling
that plebiscite zoning cannot fulfill zoning statute procedural require-
ments. Other states have determined that although the grant of zon-
444. Id at 337-38 (emphasis added).
445. See supra notes 433-434 and accompanying text. Madison wrote that factions
have divided men into parties, "inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered
them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their
common good." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed.,
1937).
ing power applies to direct legislative zoning, the added procedural
due process requirements in the grant of power do not. Finally,
while certain states have prohibited plebiscite zoning because such a
process would lead to piecemeal zoning not in accordance with the
binding comprehensive plan, other states have characterized compre-
hensive plans as advisory, rather than binding, and have thus allowed
the application of initiatives and referenda to zoning. In sum, the
states are deeply split on both whether direct legislation may be
properly applied to zoning, and what the reasons and tests should be
for either allowing or disallowing the marriage of the two.
Certain inconsistencies appear in the zoning process of states that
allow zoning by initiative and referendum. A legal fiction is engen-
dered in states that have ruled that rezonings constitute legislative
acts. These states seem to weigh pro-initiative policies more heavily
than the actual substance of a rezoning decision and, thereby, apply
form over substance in their approval of direct legislative zoning.
States finding that the grant of zoning power by enabling legisla-
tion applies to both city councils and direct electoral lawmaking, but
apply notice and hearing procedural due process requirements only
to city councils, seem to utilize a double-standard: they apply due
process requirements to city councils that can easily fulfill such re-
quirements, but do not apply procedural requirements to direct elec-
toral zoning, a process which would have serious difficulties in
fulfilling the notice and hearing requirements. After all, why should
landowners have one set of rights when their land is rezoned by a
city council vote, and another set of rights when their land is rezoned
by community residents?
States allowing direct legislative zoning to continue by characteriz-
ing comprehensive plans as merely advisory documents effectively
bypass the issue of spot-zoning by the electorate. Since zoning not in
accordance with the comprehensive plan or "piecemeal" zoning,
tends to occur when zoning is performed by the electorate, a plan
that is binding in nature would either completely prohibit electoral
zoning, or allow direct electoral zoning, resulting in spot-zoning by
the electorate. By characterizing plans as advisory, states allow
"piecemeal" zoning to continue, thereby perpetuating a practice for-
bidden by the enabling statute.
Even if these inconsistencies could be overlooked by questionable
standards and obscure rationales, the permissive level of judicial re-
view accorded to direct legislative zoning decisions would continue to
pose an obstacle to valid and effective zoning. By upholding all direct
legislative zoning ordinances which are not "arbitrary or capricious"
and by refusing to consider the possibility that the will of the people
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may, at times, be arbitrary or capricious, courts seem to allow the un-
noticed passage of arbitrary or capricious zoning ordinances.
Taken as a synergistic whole, rather than its separate legal parts,
zoning by initiative and referendum is difficult to reconcile with the
American system of representative democracy. Our Constitution is
based on the valid assumption of the founding fathers that the un-
guided will of the people makes for inferior and less effective laws
than the will of the people guided and refined by the debate of demo-
cratically elected, full-time legislative representatives. Why, then, do
states allow the practice of initiative and referendum zoning? The
will of the people in zoning is motivated more by property values and
personal tastes or distastes of certain land uses than by the long-term
good of the community. City council members, however, can take
the community's raw will, containing these albeit valid concerns, and
refine them, through debate, into zoning ordinances that take into
consideration the municipal tax base and the community need of cer-
tain unappealing land uses such as landfills, power plants, prisons,
and drug and alcohol rehabilitation clinics. City council members,
like voters, are far from infallible. Yet in a representative democ-
racy, elected representatives may be ousted from office for whatever
unpopular decisions they have made. This seems a far more effective
remedy than attempts to invalidate direct legislative zoning ordi-
nances via a highly permissive level of judicial review.
In sum, both the small scale legal problems and large scale sys-
temic political concerns posed by initiative and referendum zoning
lead to an unavoidable conclusion: Zoning by, for, and of the people
is best effectuated by representatives of the people rather than di-
rectly by the people themselves.
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